CURRICULUM VITAE

 

E. J. LOWE

 

 

EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT

 

Education

Bushey Grammar School, Bushey, Hertfordshire, 1961-67

Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge, 1968-72 (Senior Scholar, 1971-72)

St Edmund Hall, Oxford, 1972-75

            

Degrees

BA (Cantab) in History, First Class, 1971 (MA 1975)

BPhil (Oxon) in Philosophy, 1974

DPhil (Oxon) in Philosophy, 1975

 

Research undertaken for higher degrees

BPhil thesis, Oxford University, 1974: Induction and Non-Demonstrative Inference (supervised by Rom Harré)

DPhil thesis, Oxford University, 1975: Induction and Causal Inference (supervised by Simon Blackburn, examined by J. L. Mackie and Richard Swinburne)

 

Employment

Lecturer in Philosophy (Temporary), University of Reading, 1978-79    

Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Durham, 1980-90

Senior Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Durham, 1990-92

Reader in Philosophy, University of Durham, 1992-5

Professor of Philosophy, University of Durham, since 1995

 

Awards and distinctions

British Academy/Leverhulme Trust Senior Research Fellow, 2003-04

 

Editorships

General Editor (with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong) of the Cambridge Studies in Philosophy monograph series

 

Other professional appointments

Member of RAE sub-panel 60 (Philosophy), from 2005

Member of AHRC Peer Review College, from 2005

 

Membership of professional organisations

Member of: the Aristotelian Society, the Mind Association, the British Society for the Philosophy of Science, the British Society for the History of Philosophy, the Royal Institute of Philosophy, the Society for Applied Philosophy, the American Philosophical Association, the Philosophy of Science Association, the British Philosophy Association

 

 

External examining appointments

 

A. Undergraduate degree programmes

External Examiner in Philosophy for the BA in Combined Studies at Sunderland University, 1985-1989 inclusive

External Examiner in Philosophy at the University of Stirling, 1991-1995 inclusive

External Examiner in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, 1992-3

External Examiner in Philosophy at the University of London, 1995-7 inclusive and 2000

External Examiner in Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, 1996-98 inclusive             

External Examiner in PPP, Philosophy & Modern Languages, and Philosophy and Theology at the University of Oxford, 2002-04 inclusive

External Examiner in Philosophy at the University of Bristol, 2004-06 inclusive

External Examiner in Philosophy at Trinity College Dublin, 2005-07 inclusive

 

 

B. Postgraduate taught degree programmes

External Examiner for the MA in Philosophy at the University of Bristol, 2004-06 inclusive

External Examiner for the MLitt in Philosophy at the University of St Andrews, 2005-07 inclusive

 

 

C. Postgraduate research theses

1992: Oxford DPhil thesis, London MPhil thesis. 1993: Oxford DPhil thesis. 1994: Leeds        PhD thesis, London PhD thesis. 1995: Cambridge PhD thesis, Oxford DPhil thesis. 1996: Liverpool PhD thesis, Queen’s University Belfast PhD thesis. 1997: Edinburgh PhD thesis, Glasgow PhD thesis, Oxford DPhil thesis. 1998: Cambridge PhD thesis, Bristol PhD thesis. 1999: London MPhil thesis. 2000: London PhD thesis, Stirling PhD thesis. 2001: London MPhil thesis. 2002: London PhD thesis, Umea (Sweden) PhD thesis, Geneva (Switzerland) PhD thesis, Monash (Australia) PhD thesis. 2003: Oxford DPhil thesis, Karachi (Pakistan) PhD thesis, London PhD thesis, London MPhil thesis, Oxford DPhil thesis, Birmingham MPhil thesis, Nottingham PhD thesis. 2005: Sussex DPhil thesis, London PhD thesis, St Andrews PhD thesis, London PhD thesis, Reading PhD thesis.

 

 

 

TEACHING AND SUPERVISION

 

A. Undergraduate teaching

 

Areas of specialism:  metaphysics, philosophy of logic, philosophy of mind, Locke

Areas of competence:  history of modern philosophy from Descartes to Kant, philosophy of language, political philosophy, philosophy of science

 

Current undergraduate teaching responsibilities

Metaphysics: third year module, sole responsibility

Logic: second year module, sole responsibility

 

 

 

 

B. Postgraduate research supervision

 

Sharon Ney: PhD student, topic: the logical possibility of time travel, degree awarded 1993

Susan Southgate: PhD student, topic: personal identity, degree awarded 1994                                     

Paul S. McDonald: PhD student [AHRB funded], supervised jointly with Prof. D. E. Cooper, topic: Cartesian doubt and Husserlian phenomenology, degree awarded 1996

Man Cheung Chung: PhD student, supervised jointly with Dr A. J. Hamilton, topic: philosophical issues in psychology and psychiatry (registration temporarily suspended)

Martin Connor: PhD student, supervised jointly with Dr P. J. FitzPatrick, topic: the Stoics on nature and truth, degree awarded 2001

Nicholas Southgate: PhD student, topic: the philosophy of personal identity, degree awarded 1999

Sophie Gibb: PhD student, topic: the metaphysics of mental causation, degree awarded 2003

William J. Pollard: PhD student [AHRB funded], topic: norms and rationality, degree awarded 2002

Geraldine Coggins: PhD student, topic: metaphysical problems of existence, degree awarded 2003

Yasushi Ihara: PhD student, topic: metaphysics and Zen philosophy

Darrell Rowbottom: PhD student, topic: metaphysics and scientific realism, degree awarded 2005

Jonathan Tallant: PhD student, topic: philosophy of time, degree awarded 2005

George Rea: PhD student, topic: induction and scientific method

Daisuke Kaida: PhD student, topic: metaphysics of mind

Phillip Meadows: PhD student, topic: geometry of visual space

Paul Winstanley: PhD student, topic: modal metaphysics and the mind-body problem

Matthew Conduct: PhD student [AHRB funded], topic: perception and action

Richard Clarkson: PhD student, topic: ontology and mental representation

 

 

 

ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

 

Current departmental responsibilities:

Chairman of the Board of Examiners in Philosophy, University of Durham

 

Current college responsibilities:

College tutor for University College Durham (jointly with Mrs S. L. Lowe)

 

 

 

RESEARCH AND PUBLICATIONS

 

Main research interests: problems of identity and substance; the logic of sortal terms; the logic of conditionals; problems of causation and natural law; induction and scientific method; problems of space and time; the philosophy of perception; the philosophy of action; the problem of free will; the mind-body problem; philosophical and psychological problems of human rationality; the philosophical thought of John Locke

 

 

A1.  Published books

 

1. Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms (Aristotelian Monograph Series, No. 10), Oxford & New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989, pp. vi + 210. Reviews: P. F. Snowdon, Philosophical Books 32, 1991, 37-9; H. W. Noonan, Philosophy 66, 1991, 248-9; G. Engelbretsen, Iyyun 40, 1991, 100-105; P. Simons, Mind 101, 1992, 581-2; M. Baur, Review of Metaphysics 46, 1992, 166-8

 

2.  Locke on Human Understanding, London & New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. x + 203. Reviews: A. Miller, Locke Newsletter 26, 1995, 141-55; P. Snowdon, Mind 105, 1996, 348-51; B. Maund, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, 1996, 528-30; N. Unwin, Philosophical Books 38, 1997, 97-8; E. Barbanell, Canadian Philosophical Reviews 15, 1995, 410-12; D. W. Hamlyn,      Philosophical Investigations 20, 1997, 155-9; D. Doering, Jahrbuch zur Liberalismus-Forschung 8, 1996, 251-2; A. Nelson & L. Nolan, Philosophia 27, 1999, 665-8

 

3.  Subjects of Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. x + 209. Reviews: K. Sutherland, Times Higher Education Supplement, Oct. 11, 1996, 21; J. Heil, Times Literary Supplement, Jan. 10, 1997, 27; G. Madell, Philosophy 72, 1997, 147-50; J. Brown, Philosophical Books 39, 1998, 56-8; K. Paprzycka, Canadian Philosophical Reviews 17, 1997, 45-7; J. L. Bermudez, Philosophical Quarterly 49, 1999, 272-5; U. Uus, Journal of Consciousness Studies 6, 1999, 90-1; C. Macdonald, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60, 2000, 224-8; C. J. L. Talmage, Dialogue 37, 1998, 631-3

 

4.  The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity and Time, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, pp. viii + 275. Reviews: F.Jackson, Times Literary Supplement, Apr. 9, 1999, 33; K. Hawley, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50, 1999, 478-82; S. McLeod, History and Philosophy of Logic 20, 1999, 141-3; E. Olson, Mind 109, 967-9; J. Heil, Philosophical Review 110, 91-4; G. Rosenkrantz, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64, 2002, 728-36

 

5.  An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. xiii + 318. Reviews: M. di Francesco, Il Sole 24 Ore, 292, Oct. 29 2000, 34; St.E. Cuypers, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 3, 2001; S. Crawford, Times Literary Supplement, 5167, Apr. 12 2002, 29] Spanish language version: Filosofia de la Mente, trans. O. Fernandez Prat, Idea Books, 2000, pp. 281

 

6.  A Survey of Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, pp. xiii + 402. Reviews: T. Crane, Times Higher Education Supplement, May 31, 2002; G. Keil, Zeitschrift fur Philosophische Forschung 57, 2003, 320-4

 

7. Locke, London & New York: Routledge, 2005, pp. xiii + 220.

 

8.  The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006.

 

 

A2. Edited volumes

 

1. Analytic Philosophy Without Naturalism, ed. A. Corradini, S. Galvan & E. J. Lowe, London & New York: Routledge, 2005.

 

 

 

B.  Published articles  

 

1.  Neither intentional nor unintentional, Analysis 38, 1978, 117-18

2.  Indicative and counterfactual conditionals, Analysis 39, 1979, 139-41

3.  For want of a nail, Analysis 40, 1980, 50-2

4.  Peacocke and Kraemer on Butler’s Problem, Analysis 40, 1980,113-18

5.  Active and passive euthanasia: an objection, Philosophy 55, 1980, 550-1   

6.  Reply to Davis, Analysis 40, 1980, 187-90              

7.  Sortal terms and natural laws, American Philosophical Quarterly 17, 1980, 253-60 [Prize Essay]

8.  An analysis of intentionality, Philosophical Quarterly 30, 1980, 294-304

9.  Against an argument for token identity, Mind 90, 1981, 120-1

10. “All actions occur inside the body”, Analysis 41, 1981, 126-9

11. Indirect perception and sense data, Philosophical Quarterly 31, 1981, 330-42

12. Laws, dispositions and sortal logic, American Philosophical Quarterly 19, 1982, 41-50

13. The paradox of the 1,001 cats, Analysis 42, 1982, 27-30

14. Reply to Geach, Analysis 42, 1982, 31

15. Intentionality and intuition:  a reply to Davies, Analysis 42, 1982, 85

16. On being a cat, Analysis 42, 1982, 174-7

17. Intentionality: a reply to Stiffler, Philosophical Quarterly 32, 1982, 354-7

18. On the alleged necessity of true identity statements, Mind 91, 1982, 579-84

19. Instantiation, identity and constitution, Philosophical Studies 44, 1983, 45-59

20. A simplification of the logic of conditionals, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 24, 1983,  357-66

21. On the identity of artifacts, Journal of Philosophy 80, 1983, 220-32

22. Reply to Hornsby on actions, Analysis 43, 1983, 140-1

23. A note on a response of Hornsby’s, Analysis 44, 1984, 196-7

24. Wright versus Lewis on the transitivity of counterfactuals, Analysis 44, 1984, 180-3

25. Reply to Baldwin on de re modalities, Mind 94, 1985, 101-3

26. “If A and B, then A”, Analysis 45, 1985, 93-8

27. Sortal terms and absolute identity, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64, 1986, 64-71

28. Necessity and the will in Locke’s theory of action, History of Philosophy Quarterly 3, 1986, 149-63 [reprinted in U. Thiel (ed.), Locke: Metaphysics, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002, 247-61]

29. Reply to Wright on conditionals and transitivity, Analysis 45, 1985, 200-2

30. What do we see directly?, American Philosophical Quarterly 23, 1986, 277-85

31. The topology of visual appearance, Erkenntnis 25, 1986, 271-4   

32. Miracles and laws of nature, Religious Studies 23, 1987, 263-78

33. Reply to Dale, Analysis 46, 1986, 83-5

34. Substance, An Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. G. H. R. Parkinson, London: Routledge, 1988, 255-78

35. Noonan on naming and predicating, Analysis 46, 1986, 159

36. The indexical fallacy in McTaggart’s proof of the unreality of time, Mind 96, 1987, 62-70

37. Not a counterexample to modus ponens, Analysis 47, 1987, 44-7   

38. On a supposed temporal/modal parallel, Analysis 46, 1986, 195-7

39. Reply to Over, Analysis 46, 1986, 200

40. What is the “problem of induction”?, Philosophy 62, 1987, 325-40

41. Lewis on perdurance versus endurance, Analysis 47, 1987, 152-4 [reprinted in H. Noonan (ed.), Identity, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993, 311-13]

42. Reply to Noonan, Analysis 47, 1987, 201-3

43. Reply to Le Poidevin and Mellor, Mind 96, 1987, 539-42

44. Substance, identity and time, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 62, 1988, 61-78

45. What is a criterion of identity?, Philosophical Quarterly 39, 1989, 1-21 [reprinted in H. Noonan (ed.), Identity, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993, 435-55]

46. The problems of intrinsic change: rejoinder to Lewis, Analysis 48, 1988, 72-7

47. David Lewis, Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, ed. H. Burkhardt & B. Smith, Munich: Philosophia, 1991, 453-4

48. Impredicative identity criteria and Davidson’s criterion of event identity, Analysis 49, 1989, 178-81

49. Conditionals, context and transitivity, Analysis 50, 1990, 80-7 

50. Real selves: persons as a substantial kind, Human Beings, ed. D. Cockburn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 87-107 [Review: C. Gill, Philosophical Quarterly 42, 1992, 502-4]

51. Objects and criteria of identity, A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, ed. R. Hale & C. Wright, Oxford & Cambridge MA: Basil Blackwell, 1997, 613-33

52. Experience and its objects, The Contents of Experience, ed. T. Crane, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992 [Reviews: T. Sorell, New Scientist, 14 Nov. 1992, 45-6; A.Millar, Mind 102, 1993, 362-6]

53. Contributions to Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, ed. R. E. Asher et al., Oxford & Aberdeen: Pergamon Press & Aberdeen University Press, 1993: a priori; abstract ideas;     epistemology; natural kinds; sortal terms [reprinted in Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Language, ed. P. V. Lamarque, Oxford: Elsevier Science, 1997]

54. Jackson on classifying conditionals, Analysis 51, 1991, 126-30

55. Substance and selfhood, Philosophy 66, 1991, 81-99

56. One-level versus two-level identity criteria, Analysis 51, 1991, 192-4

57. Noun phrases, quantifiers, and generic names, Philosophical Quarterly 41, 1991, 287-300

58. Rationality, deduction and mental models, Rationality, ed. K. Manktelow & D. Over, London: Routledge, 1993, 211-30

59. Primitive substances, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 1994, 531-52

60. The problem of psychophysical causation, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70, 1992, 263-76 [reprinted in T. O’Connor & D. Robb (eds), Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary Readings, London: Routledge, 2003, 49-64]

61. McTaggart’s paradox revisited, Mind 101, 1992, 323-6

62. Reply to Ramachandran on conditionals and transitivity, Analysis 52, 1992, 77-80

63. Perception: a causal representative theory, New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception, ed. E. Wright, Aldershot: Avebury, 1993, 136-52

64. Comment on Le Poidevin, Mind 102, 1993, 171-3

65. Contributions to The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, ed. T. Honderich, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995: a priori and a posteriori; A-series and B-series; affirmative and negative propositions; analytic and synthetic statements; axiom; being; Bennett; capacity; Carnap; cat, Schroedinger’s; class; contingent and necessary statements; Dummett; existence; existential proposition; fact; generalization; identity, criterion of; Jackson; kind, natural; Kripke; Mellor; mereology; mode; monism and pluralism; names; necessary and sufficient conditions; necessity, epistemic; necessity, logical; necessity, metaphysical; nominalism; ontology; particulars and non-particulars; philosophical logic; potentiality; propensity; Ramsey; realization; recursion, definition by; redundancy theory of truth; reflective equilibrium; rigid designator; self; semantic theory of truth; specious present; Stalnaker; Strawson; things; thought experiments; time; time preference; time travel; truth; universals; Wiggins

66. Self, reference and self-reference, Philosophy 68, 1993, 15-33

67. Are the natural numbers individuals or sorts?, Analysis 53,1993, 142-6

68. Vague identity and quantum indeterminacy, Analysis 54, 1994, 110-14

69. The causal autonomy of the mental, Mind 102, 1993, 629-44  

70. Ontological dependency, Philosophical Papers 23, 1994, 31-48 

71. Die Metaphysik und ihre Möglichkeit, Metaphysik—Neue Zugänge zu alten Fragen, ed. J. Brandl, A. Hieke & P. Simons, St. Augustin: Academia Verlag, 1995, 11-32                

72. The truth about counterfactuals, Philosophical Quarterly 45,1995, 41-59

73. The problem of the many and the vagueness of constitution, Analysis 55, 1995, 179-82

74. Coinciding objects: in defence of the “standard account”, Analysis 55, 1995, 171-8

75. Tense and persistence, Questions of Time and Tense, ed. R. Le Poidevin, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, 43-59

76. The metaphysics of abstract objects, Journal of Philosophy 92, 1995, 509-24

77. There are no easy problems of consciousness, Journal of Consciousness Studies 2, 1995, 266-71 [reprinted in Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem, ed. J. Shear, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997, 117-23]

78. Why is there anything at all?, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 70, 1996, 111-20

79. John Locke; Identity, Encyclopedia of Empiricism, ed. D.Garrett & E. Barbanell, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997, 172-7, 206-15

80. Reply to Noonan on vague identity, Analysis 57, 1997, 88-91

81. John Locke, Companion to the Philosophers, ed. R. L. Arrington, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, 369-75 [reprinted in The World’s Great Philosophers, ed. R. L. Arrington, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003, 195-202]

82. Ontological categories and natural kinds, Philosophical Papers 26, 1997, 29-46

83. Philosophical logic, Contemporary British and American Philosophy and Philosophers, ed. O. Kang, forthcoming 

84. Conditional probability and conditional beliefs, Mind 105, 1996, 603-15

85. Why there are no easy problems of consciousness [abstract], History and Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter 22, Spring 1996, 17-18                                               

86. Concreta: substance—introduction, Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings, ed. S. D. Hales, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1999, 371-6

87. Personal experience and belief: the significance of external symbolic storage for the emergence of modern human cognition, Cognition and Material Culture: The Archaeology of Symbolic Storage, ed. C. Scarre & C. Renfrew, Cambridge: McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, 1998, 89-96

88. Whose rationality? Logical theory and the problem of deductive competence, Cahiers de Psychologie Cognitive/Current Psychology of Cognition 16, 1997, 140-6

89. Entity, Identity and Unity, Erkenntnis 48, 1998, 191-208

90. Form without Matter, Ratio 11, 1998, 214-34 [reprinted in Form and Matter: Themes in Contemporary Metaphysics, ed. D. S. Oderberg, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999]

91. Contributions to The Fontana/Norton Dictionary of Modern Thought, ed. A. Bullock and S. Trombley, 3rd edn, London: Harper Collins, 1999: behaviourism; conventionalism; meaning;     nominalism; realism; relativism

92. Self, agency and mental causation, Journal of Consciousness Studies 6, 1999, 225-39 [reprinted in The Volitional Brain: Towards a Neuroscience of Free Will, ed. B. Libet, A. Freeman & K. Sutherland, Thorverton: Imprint Academic, 1999]

93. Contributions to The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. R. Audi, 2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999: Armstrong, Dummett

94. Abstraction, properties and immanent realism, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: Metaphysics, ed. T. Rockmore, Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy     Documentation Center, 1999, 195-205

95. Commentary on A. J. Hamilton’s ‘False Memory Syndrome and the Authority of Personal Memory Claims’, Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 5, 1998, 309-10

96. Vague identity and quantum indeterminacy: further reflections, Analysis 59, 1999, 328-30

97. In defence of the simplicity argument, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78, 2000, 105-12

98. Individuation, Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, ed. M. J. Loux & D. W. Zimmerman, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 75-95

99. Causal closure principles and emergentism, Philosophy 75, 2000, 571-85

100. Identity, composition, and the simplicity of the self, Soul, Body and Survival, ed. K. J. Corcoran, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001, 139-58

101. Locke, Martin and substance, Philosophical Quarterly 50, 2000, 499-514

102. Event causation and agent causation, Grazer Philosophische Studien 61, 2001, 1-20

103. Properties, modes and universals, The Modern Schoolman 74, 2002, 137-50

104. Ontic indeterminacy of identity unscathed, Analysis 61, 2001, 241-5

105. Dispositions and laws, Metaphysica 2, 2001, 5-23

106. Metaphysical nihilism and the subtraction argument, Analysis 62, 2002, 62-73

107. Kinds, essence and natural necessity, Individuals, Essence and Identity: Themes of Analytic Metaphysics, ed. A. Bottani, M. Carrara & P. Giaretta, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002, 189-206

108. A defence of the four-category ontology, Argument und Analyse, ed. C. U. Moulines & K. G. Niebergall, Paderborn: Mentis, 2002, 225-40

109. Is knowing a state of mind? Critical notice of T. Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10, 2002, 483-9

110. Substantial change and spatiotemporal coincidence, Ratio 16, 2003, 140-60

111. The rational and the real: some doubts about the programme of ‘rational analysis’, Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality, ed. J. L. Bermudez & A. Millar, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, 175-85

112. Recent advances in metaphysics [abstract], Formal Ontology in Information Systems: Collected Papers from the Second International Conference, New York: ACM Press, 2001, 1

113. Material coincidence and the cinematographic fallacy: a response to Olson, Philosophical Quarterly 52, 2002, 369-72

114. Locke: compatibilist event-causalist or libertarian substance-causalist? Critical study of G. Yaffe’s Liberty Worth the Name: Locke on Free Agency, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68, 2004, 688-701

115. La connaissance metaphysique, Revue de metaphysique et morale, 2002, 453-71

116. A serious look at serious naturalism: review essay on W. L. Craig & J. P. Moreland (eds), Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, Philosophia Christi 4, 2002, 197-2002

117. In defense of medium-sized specimens of dry goods, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68, 2003, 704-10

118. Personal agency, Minds and Persons, ed. A. O’Hear, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 211-27

119. [With Storrs McCall] 3D/4D equivalence, the twins paradox, and absolute time, Analysis 63, 2003, 114-23

120. Substance causation, persons, and free will, Persons: An Interdisciplinary Approach, ed. C. Kanzian, J. Quitterer & E. Runggaldier, Vienna, 2003, 76-88

121. Metaphysical realism and the unity of truth, Monism, ed. A. Bachli & K. Petrus, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2003, 109-23

122. Recent advances in metaphysics, Facta Philosophica 5, 2003, 3-24

123. Some formal ontological relations, Dialectica 58 (2004), 297-316

124. Physical causal closure and the invisibility of mental causation, Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, ed. S. Walter & H.-D. Heckmann, Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2003, 137-54

125. Identity, Individuality and Unity, Philosophy 78, 2003, 321-36

126. Entries in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2nd edn, ed. T. Honderich, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005: animalism in personal identity; causal asymmetry or direction; counterpart theory; disquotation; emergence; essentialism; f