Between this [Falsehood], and Truth, ly's the Proper Sphere of wit, which though it seems to incline to falsehood, do's it only to give Intelligence to Truth. For as there is a Trick in Arithmetique, By giving a False Number, to finds out a True one: So wit by a certaine slight of the Minda, deliver's things otherwise than they are in Nature, by rendering them greater or lesse than they really are (which is cal'd Hyperbols) or by putting them into some other condition than Nature ever did.... But when it imloys those things which it borrows of Falsehood, to the Benefit and advantage of Truth, as in Allegories, Fables, and Apologues, it is of excellent use, as making a Deeper impression into the mindes of Men then if the same Truths were plainly deliver'd. (Samuel Butler, Characters and Passages from Note-books, Cambridge, 1908, p.401, as quoted by F.Mayne. The Wit and Satire of
PART ONE THE THEORY OF MEANINGS

Chapter One. Variations on the Theory of Sense and Reference

§ 1. How to hypostatise meanings.

It has become customary amongst analytic philosophers to put forward arguments against the tendency to 'hypostatise' meanings, to treat them as 'objects', 'things', 'substances', a tendency which is firmly rooted in such natural language constructions as: 'he had forgotten the meaning of the word "rabbit"', or: 'he thought the meaning of "rabitting" was the same (thing) as the meaning of "burrowing"', and so on. The basis for such arguments seems to be that meanings, at least as these are conceived by analytic philosophers, do not seem to support an ontological discipline of the kind which is supported by objects, events, properties, sets of objects, and so on. Questions can be asked and answered concerning, for example, the conditions which must be satisfied for two mathematical objects to be identical, or concerning the relations between a material object and its properties, but whilst such questions can be reasonably posed concerning entities which belong to the world of familiar objects of reference, parallel questions seem to be wholly inappropriate when turned inward, as it were, to the meanings which we employ in our discourse concerning that world.

There is indeed a perfectly valid feeling of ontological impotence in the face of questions concerning the nature of meanings 'as such', and this has led many to adopt the view that philosophy must avoid even the semblance of reference to meanings. Ask not 'is the meaning of A the same as the meaning of B?' they urge, but rather 'does A mean the same as B?'. As a result of this embargo of meanings from the range of entities about which philosophers can engage in serious discourse, there has arisen a conception of ontology as a discipline which excludes meanings from its subject-matter; ontological investigation is thought to have as its sole province the totality of object-
temporal world, although as we shall see there is more to the totality of object-entities than this). Such philosophical questions as arise concerning meanings, that is, in more acceptable jargon, concerning the use and understanding of words and sentences and of higher-order linguistic constructions such as arguments and theories, are relegated to other disciplines, for example to what Quine ingenuously calls 'ideology'.

It is possible, however, to challenge this set of analytic-philosophical presuppositions. To support such a challenge it would be necessary to develop a rigorous discipline of ontology which would have as its subject-matter all entities, including meaning-entities. From the point of view of such a discipline ontological impotence concerning meanings would be seen as something which was induced by the expectation that the kinds of answers which we shall receive to ontological questions about meanings will be similar in form to the answers which we receive from the same questions as put to object-entities. We hope to suggest that it is possible — though only with great difficulty — to develop a generalised conceptual framework within which a different set of answers to these questions can reasonably be advanced. And we hope to show also that there is positive philosophical value in the analysis which results, which cannot be simulated by any investigations which rest on the device of 'paraphrasing meanings away', even if such investigations should prove, in the short run, to involve less conceptual discomfiture, e.g. of the type which is to be expected when one has to fit oneself into an alien philosophical framework.

Of course, in using such terms as 'meaning-entity' we run the risk of the hypostatization of such 'entities', but we may hope to skirt the disadvantages of such a course by ensuring that it does not involve any presuppositions imported from the ontology of objects, for example presuppositions to the effect that the domain of meanings is to be cut up into individual units in just the same way that we divide the domain of object-entities, or to the effect that the kind of re-identification which we expect in the case of
solutions to the problems of particularising and identifying meaning-entities can be obtained, in fact, only on the basis of just the kind of ontological investigation whose possibility is denied by analytic philosophers.

One valuable element in the analytic philosophical conception of an opposition between 'ontology', as a discipline which pertains to objects, and 'ideology' which would pertain to meanings, is the recognition that we have to deal here with two disjoint categories. Many attempts to develop an 'ontology of meanings' have run aground owing to a failure to appreciate this absolute categorial distinction and to a consequent assumption that it is possible to speak of meanings as objects. We shall see that it is an indispensable presupposition of any adequate ontology of meaning-entities that the opposition between these two domains, of objects and of meanings, should be brought into light. It will follow that not every theory of meaning can serve as the starting-point for our investigations. In particular, theories of the type put forward by Russell and Moore at the beginning of this century would be unacceptable, for according to such theories the meaning of, say, a proper name is identified with the object, which may be a real material object, denoted by that name. One unacceptable consequence of this ('Russellian') approach is that the form of the meaning of a given sentence depends not only upon the syntactic structure of the sentence and of its constituents, but also upon the results of non-linguistic investigations concerning the existence of referents ('meanings') for such terms. Thus the form of the meaning of

(a) 'the queen of England is quite bald'

will be different, contingently, from the form of the meaning of

(b) 'the queen of France is quite bald',

even though the two expressions are identical in grammatical structure. However, as Frege recognised, language can securely execute its power of expressing an incredible richness of thought with relatively limited means
are made up of thought-parts which correspond to sentence-parts which express them. (Frege, 1914, p.262).

A second, and for our purposes even more important drawback which threatens theories of meaning according to which the meaning of a proper name is identified with its referent, is that the ontological dichotomy between meaning and object fails to be respected. For a sentence-meaning, which has among its constituents the meanings of proper names appearing in the sentence, is presented as a peculiarly hybrid entity which would somehow straddle the boundary between the transcendent world of objects and the non-transcendent world of meaning-formations.

In contrast, the theory of meaning which Frege himself put forward in his paper 'On Sense and Reference' (hereafter: SuB) suggests what is, ontologically, a much more promising account of the nature of meanings. Where Russell had been content, in his analysis of the meaning of proper names, with only two terms - the proper name in question and its referent - Frege argued in favour of a three-term account for all linguistic meanings, an account which may be presented by means of the following schema:

\[
\text{sign} \quad \text{sense of the sign} \quad \rightarrow \text{referent of the sign (if there is one)}
\]

What is crucial, for our purposes, in Frege's account is that he explicitly denies that the reference of a term is a constituent of its meaning or 'sense'. It thereby becomes possible for him to acknowledge within his theory the fact that not every meaningful sign need have a referent. And he can acknowledge also the (related) fact that the meanings of such non-denoting expressions may be identical in form with the meanings of similarly constructed denoting expressions. For example, if we return to the two sentences (a) and (b) on p.3 above, we can conceive of situations in which these sentences are used by English-speakers who are unfamiliar with or unconcerned with the facts of modern European constitutional history, and the meanings or senses of the given sentences as understood by these speakers must be identical in form,
from linguistic units each of which has a sense equivalent to the sense of a corresponding unit in the other sentence. Again, only if we grant that there is at least the possibility of grasping composite meanings in such a purely syntactically-guided way can the power of language be truly understood.

This example has a further importance, however, in that it reveals the extent to which meanings are dependent upon contexts or situations of use, not merely in the sense of grammatical dependence (dependence upon sentential context) which determines, for example, the difference in meaning between the first and third terms of 'Drink your drink', but in a far wider sense, such that the meaning of a syntactically identical expression may be different, for example at different times, in different places, and as uttered by different speakers. Of course no analytic philosopher (worth his salt) would wish to deny this dependence upon context for such clear cases of context-sensitive ('taken reflexive') expressions as 'now', 'then', 'this', 'here', 'my', 'she'. But the lessons of such examples have not been adequately learned, especially by those philosophers, such as Frege himself, for whom the philosophical inadequacies of natural language were to be compensated for by a recurrent appeal to one or other artificially constructed formal language. For theories of meaning developed in respect of such languages, which were constructed in such a way that all those expressions which openly betray their context-sensitivity should be eliminated, could not but fail to take sufficient account of the fact that, as we shall claim, all expressions are 'widely' context-sensitive in the sense indicated above.
§ 2. Context-sensitivity and the epistemological basis of the theory of meaning.

What are the general features of contexts of language-use which contribute to the senses of expressions involved? These are, we shall claim, their (broadly) epistemological features: But it should be stressed that the term 'epistemology' is used in such a way as to designate a discipline which has as its subject-matter not only the knowledge which is possessed by given subjects, but all 'cognitive possessions' including their beliefs, surmises, desires, and even their habits and skills. Simply put, however, it is what is known or believed at a given time and place and by given speakers which plays the crucial role in determining the meanings of the expressions which they use.

It is to Frege's credit that he was the first modern philosopher to recognize the nature of sense or meaning as a function of 'cognitive value' (see e.g. Sub, p. 50), and although there is much that can be criticised in Frege's theory it will be useful to consider some of the (now familiar) arguments which were advanced by Frege in support of his epistemological account of senses.

Imagine, first of all, two epistemically distinct situations, with regard to an expression such as 'the largest prime number', one situation in which the users of the expression are unaware of the fact that it lacks a referent, another in which its users are or have become aware of this fact. (A variant and perhaps more convincing example is obtained if one is prepared to assume that some mathematically undecided problem such as Goldbach's conjecture will, say next week, be found to be false; one then considers instead the expression 'the least non-Goldbachian even number'). We are dealing here, I shall claim, with two distinct meanings of one and the same expression; metaphorically speaking the two sets of users are, at least in this particular area of language-use, speaking different languages.

Frege himself was interested in how such sentences as '3 + 5 = 8', 'the victor at Jena = the vanquished at Waterloo', 'the morning star = the evening star' can have cognitive value.
That sentences of the given type can have cognitive value is instanced by the fact that the morning star and the evening star are one and the same was an astronomical discovery of some importance, which could certainly not have been achieved by means of bare reflection on the terms involved. As a consequence of this discovery however the assertion in question, somewhat paradoxically, begins to acquire an inferior cognitive value; the two terms, used as proper names, become virtually interchangeable since their senses converge (except with respect to those sense-components which are purely syntactically contributed; see text to n.8 below). The motivation to develop a three-term approach to the theory of meaning is the need to account philosophically for such effects, and for this it is indispensable to recognise a dimension (or dimensions) of senses which are able to function to a degree independently of the dimension of reference.

The first problem which arises for this kind of epistemological approach to meaning-entities is the problem of explaining how meanings can ever become public property, can be such as to allow communication between the various speakers of a given linguistic community. The classical 'idea' theory of meaning, which correctly regarded meanings or 'concepts' as closely related to certain kinds of complex mental states, sought to explain the ability of meanings to serve in communication, to be identically passed from speaker to speaker, by appealing to the shared possession of duplicate sides, somehow located in the mind of each individual member of the community involved. Frege resisted such 'psychologism' — with what justice we shall have occasion to investigate below — and he thereby failed to see that it was possible to preserve something of great value from the 'idea' theory, precisely by abandoning the supposition that in order to account for successful communication it is necessary that one assumes that the meanings possessed by one and the same term should be identical from speaker to speaker. Unfortunately Frege abandoned instead the beneficial content of the 'idea' theory: that it was able to explain the way in which meanings function in the actual cognitive experience of individual subjects, and he sought to preserve the erroneous view that meanings should be, relative to any particular large-scale epistemological context, identical for all the speakers of a given community.
This he did by developing the conception of meanings or senses as abstract entities associated not with mental acts (or complexes of mental states) on the part of actual language-users, but with the linguistic expressions themselves. Thus like the 'idea'-theorists he developed a conception of meanings as entities which would be *individuated through their associated expressions*; what is necessary, as we shall see, is a conception of meanings as entities which would be *individuated through their acts* or - which comes to the same thing - through the contexts reflected in those acts.

It is the move to a conception of senses as abstract entities which reveals the extent to which Frege had failed to learn the true lesson of the epistemological account of meaning. It is a consequence of this account that identity of meaning is virtually eliminated - at the level of the philosophy of language - as an explanatory notion. For whilst it may be true that there are certain coincidences of meanings or of meaning-giving acts between different speakers, or between one and the same speaker at different times, just as it may be true that there are similar coincidences of colour-images or taste-complexes, one can make no appeal to such coincidences in any account of the functioning of language (nor of our recognition of colours or tastes).

Frege was perceptive enough to recognise the truth of all of these remarks with regard to 'subjective presentations' (*subjektive Vorstellungen* generally, but misleadingly, translated as 'ideas') which denoted, for Frege, the occasional psychological states or events which accompany (*inter alia*) our use of language. How close Frege came to recognising the crucial point is seen in the following passage where he remarks that

> the task of our ordinary languages ... is essentially accomplished if the men who are communicating connect the same thought with the same sentence, or approximately so. (1896, p.55f, as trans. in S&R p.124, my emphasis).

But he goes on to make a quite artificial opposition between ordinary language and, by implication, ordinary thought, with contexts of scientific and mathemat-
ical argument:

The situation is different if he simply tells us if conclusions have to be made. (loc.cit., p.56).

Frege failed to see, therefore, that even under the given conditions it is still possible to construct an adequate philosophy of language, and in the end also an adequate philosophy of logic, merely that the considerations involved will be far more delicate and complex than is the case if we can restrict our attention to the level of linguistic expressions alone.

Frege's commitment to senses as abstract entities which would serve as the carriers of 'objectivity' in linguistic situations raises a further problem of some independent, methodological interest. For he assumed that the appeal to such entities could explain not, indeed, any normal everyday effects of language, but certainly, say, the role played by language in certain logically rigorous arguments. What he failed to recognise was that any such retrospective logician's construction must fail to be of explanatory power with regard to the areas of experience from which they are abstracted. This is not to suggest that Frege held a view of senses as the result of processes of abstraction (although as we shall see, there are some who hold that he ought to have held such a view), but certainly the account which he gives of senses is determined by independent logical considerations, something which leads to similar results.
§3. The linguistic division of labour.

It is certainly a tendentious claim, however, that synonymy or strict identity of meaning has no explanatory role in the philosophy of language. Perhaps we can give some idea of the considerations which led to this claim by appealing to certain arguments put forward by Putnam for a different, though related purpose.

One principle argument in favour of the importance of synonymy to the theory of language derives, I believe, from another classical doctrine to the effect that the reference of an expression is something which is determined by its sense, or, in a different idiom, that extension is determined by intension. Now the variety of possible subjective presentations which can be associated with a given term in such a way that reference or extension is preserved, is so great that to explain the identity of extension across this wide range of uses one is almost always tempted to have recourse to an identical 'super-concept' - a sense or intension - which is somehow not subject to the transient instability and to the impurities of individual 'ideas'. But is this relation of 'determination' between sense and reference or between intension and extension really so intimate as we have been led to believe? Putnam's examples suggest that it is not:

Suppose you are like me and cannot tell an elm from a beech tree. We still say that the extension of 'elm' in my idiolect is the same as the extension of 'elm' in anyone else's, viz., the set of all elm trees, and that the set of all beech trees is the extension of 'beech' in both of our idiolects. Thus 'elm' in my idiolect has a different extension from 'beech' in your idiolect (as it should). Is it really credible that this difference in extension should be brought about by some difference in our concepts? My concept of an elm tree is exactly the same as my concept of a beech tree (I blush to confess). (Putnam, 1973, p.704).

What Putnam fails to recognise (or confusingly expresses) is that his concepts of elm and beech are different in being associated with different terms. The account of concepts (meanings of predicates) which we shall adopt here conceives them as stratified entities consisting, in the lowest stratum, of components
determined by the linguistic material ('beech', 'elm', etc.) involved. Putnam nevertheless draws what we see as the correct conclusion from his indication of the hiatus which lies between meanings and extensions, namely that there is, in his terms, a division of linguistic labour:

We could hardly use such words as 'elm' and 'aluminium' if no one possessed a way of recognising elm trees and aluminium metal; but not everyone to whom the distinction is important has to be able to make the distinction. (loc.cit.)

Let us consider as a further example the term 'gold'. Putnam points, first of all, to the existence of a mundane division of labour (in an extended sense) in our society between those who

- have the 'job' of wearing gold wedding rings;
- have the 'job' of selling gold wedding rings;
- have the job of telling whether or not something is really gold. It is not at all necessary or efficient ... that everyone who buys and sells gold be able to tell whether or not something is really gold in a society where this form of dishonesty is uncommon (selling fake gold) and in which one can easily consult an expert in case of doubt. (op.cit., p.704f)

Such facts engender a further division, a division of linguistic labour:

everyone to whom gold is important for any reason has to acquire the word 'gold'; but he does not have to acquire the method of recognising whether something is or is not gold. He can rely on a special subclass of speakers. The features that are generally thought to be present in connection with a general name - necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in the extension, ways of recognising whether something is in the extension, etc. - are all present in the linguistic community considered as a collective body; but that collective body divides the 'labour' of knowing and employing those various parts of the 'meaning' of 'gold'. (p.705).

Every linguistic community, Putnam claims, possesses at least some terms whose associated "criteria" are known only to a subset of the speakers who acquire the terms, and whose use by the other speakers depends upon a structured cooperation between them and the speakers in the relevant subsets. (p.706).

Putnam's arguments succeed, we believe, in capturing certain crucial features of the actual employment of language (both by experts and by their
fellows), something which is lost in Frege's appeal to objective senses, despite the fact that the given features display themselves at least as (if not more) widely in scientific and mathematical contexts as elsewhere. But is there really any need to make an appeal to some kind of 'structured cooperation' between the various members of one and the same society?

Consider the meaning of a proper name, say 'Mantup', occurring in some recently deciphered Sumerian execution-list. The meaning of 'Mantup' for us, as for the Sumerians (give or take certain liberties in the process of phonetic transliteration), is such that it refers to Mantup, hedge-priest in the land of Nippur, executed, we may suppose, on the 8th day of the 10th year of the reign of King Ekpirk. There can surely be no question of any cooperation between the Sumerians and ourselves in establishing this meaning; indeed the execution list may, for reasons of state, have been written in code, i.e. with the explicit motive of forestalling any possibility of cooperation. And nor is it necessary for there to be any associated criteria, possessed by experts, for recognising or re-identifying the referent (or the members of the extension) of a given term. For it may be that, as in Mantup's case, or in the case of a general term such as 'Sumerian', the question of identification or recognition can no longer arise. More importantly, however, it may be that it could never arise, since it is possible to confer a meaning upon a term, and to set up this kind of non-fraternal structured cooperation-at-a-distance, even though there are no pre-existent objects (or object) for which the question of 're-identification' could arise. Consider, to take just one example, the term 'Sherlock Holmes'.

Those who come to the present work with a healthy 'prejudice in favour of the actual' may justly complain at the fact that it will be assumed throughout that 'Sherlock Holmes', like many other more or less distantly related terms, has a non-existent object as its referent, namely Sherlock Holmes himself (or more precisely: itself), a fictional character or figment, created by Conan Doyle (and an entity for which, as we shall see, determinate identity criteria are unobtainable). It ought really to be unnecessary to put forward
philosophical arguments in support of this assumption: the philosopher ought more properly to be able to leave this task to the literary theorist, to the literary historian, and to the associated raggle-taggle of Baker Street irregulars, just as he can leave to the mathematician and the physicist the task of determining the status of, say, sets or real numbers or electrons. But the literary theorist is little heard amongst philosophers, and it has become necessary to argue his case in absentia, for the philosopher to make his own attempts to determine the status of the objects of the literary theorist's discipline. Here, as a precautionary measure, we sketch just one such attempt, with a warning to the reader that he will not be spared further helpings in the pages which follows:

In order to explain the behaviour of certain kinds of expression, amongst which we can include, say, 'beech', 'aluminium', 'gold', 'Dr Gustav Lauben', 'Willard van Orman Quine', it has been shown that it is necessary to appeal to some account of such terms as 'rigid designators'. The notion of rigid designator was introduced by Kripke in connection with certain problems in the theory of necessary truth, though the theory we shall develop below attempts to give this notion an epistemological rather than a metaphysical slant. Kripke asks us to consider the two assertions

(i) that 9 is greater than 7,
(ii) that the number of planets is greater than 7.

Why, he asks, can it be justifiably asserted that the former be more necessarily true than the latter?

The answer to this might be intuitively 'Well, look, the number of planets might have been different from what it in fact is. It doesn't make sense, though, to say that nine might have been different from what it in fact is.' Let us call something a rigid designator if in any possible world it designates the same object, a non-rigid...designator if that is not the case. Of course we don't require that the objects exist in all possible worlds. Certainly Nixon might not have existed if his parents had not gotten married, in the normal course of things. (Kripke, 1972, p. 269f).

We shall argue that those considerations which force the conception of, say, 'Willard Quine' as a rigid designator (in our somewhat modified sense
developed below) constrain us to take the same view of 'Sherlock Holmes'. But we can submit to this constraint only if we acknowledge that there is (in a weak sense of 'is') something which 'Sherlock Holmes' can (rigidly) designate. The temptation, in the light of an account of rigid designators as terms which would designate one and the same object through all those worlds in which that object actually exists, is to suppose that 'Holmes' rigidly designates a possible existent, that is that it designates the same object in all possible worlds in which there is an actually existent Holmes. This object would differ ontologically from, say, Nixon, only in that Holmes happens not to exist in the actual world: he is a pure possibilium. The Kripkean approach demands a more subtle account however, for unlike 'Louis IX' or 'the twentieth child of M.A. E. Dummett' which do designate pure possibilia - and hence do not designate rigidly, 10 'Holmes' does designate (has a correct designative use) in the actual world: what it designates is a fictional character created by Conan Doyle. So long as we are using this 'Holmes' (and not, say, the 'Holmes' of 'Jehoshaphat T. Holmes & Co.' which designates the owner of a firm of London tailors) and are considering its designata in other possible worlds, then it becomes clear that none of these designata exists in the worlds with which they are correlated. Holmes, then, is necessarily non-existent.

Of course this is not to deny that there may be worlds W in which there is an individual, a, who has features corresponding in every detail with the features with which Holmes has been endowed by Conan Doyle - even down to the fact that a's surname in W consists of the six letters 'H', 'o', 'l', 'm', 'e', and 's' in that order. 11 That Holmes and the gentleman in W who studied hard in detective school to become a first-flight violinist and pipe-smoker, and went on to solve with the help of a doctor friend of his such notorious cases as..., etc., are namesakes is as irrelevant to the matter in hand as is the fact that so too (at least in part) are Holmes and Jehoshaphat T. Those who would wish to defend the identity of Holmes and Holmes_w (as the latter is defined above) are asking us to believe that an object created as a result of certain complex processes of thought, writing, printing, and sending forth into the world on the part of
Doyle and his printers and publishers could somehow, in world $W$, be born of flesh and blood parents.\textsuperscript{12}

To view a fictional being as essentially fictional involves finding these conditions incoherent; "incoherent" in the sense in which it is incoherent to suppose Gladstone becoming a transcendental number (and surviving the change). (Woods, 1974, p.77).

We do not need to appeal to this kind of incoherence, however, in order to demonstrate that turning outward to (purported) 'possible existents' will not help us to understand fictional and other kinds of non-existent and higher-order objects. For an independent consideration of the nature of such objects reveals that the perfect featural coincidence which would make the identification of, say, Holmes and Holmes,\textsubscript{$W$} so plausible a proposition (e.g. on grounds of the identity of indiscernibles) is itself something which could never be achieved. This is because there is a characteristic incompleteness of such objects; fictional objects, for example, exhibit 'loci of indeterminacy', a consequence of their being projected by what is only a finite number of sentences which are capable of determining them in only a finite number of aspects (see LWA, §38 and chs.8 and 9; cf. also ch.11 below): Thus Hamlet, e.g., is neither pimpled nor does he lack pimples. Any purported twin of Hamlet which would be an existent object (in some world $W$) must exhibit, in contrast, a characteristic completeness with respect to all determinations down to the lowest possible degree, for such an object is presentable in an unlimited number of constantly merging and shifting concrete aspects; he can be inspected (e.g. for pimples).

Thus an understanding of fictional objects and also, as we shall see, of non-existent and higher-order objects in general, turns on the acceptance of the possibility of an independent investigation of such objects as sui generis, non-concrete constituents of the actual world, accessible in various ways, to the thinking subjects who also form part of the population of that world. But such sui generis objects can be distinguished also for various possible worlds (broadly; to the extent that such worlds themselves contain
thinking subjects who engage e.g. in reading and writing works of fiction, or contain analogues of such disciplines as theology, anthropology, set theory, and so on).

It is clear that the metaphysics of possible worlds is to a large degree skew to the ontology of non-existent (and of existent) objects. Thus it would be useful if we could develop an equivalent to Kripke's metaphysical notion of rigid designator which could be understood, e.g. phenomenologically, without recourse to anything beyond this (surely sufficiently rich and complex) actual world. But what precisely is the explanatory power of Kripke's notion? In order to work toward an answer to this question we shall briefly consider certain alternative accounts of the meanings of terms we should consider rigidly designative, and in particular, accounts of the meanings of proper names, which are distinguished by the fact that a referent for 'Sherlock Holmes' is not at all demanded. We shall then draw attention to those points where these alternative accounts reveal themselves as inadequate.
§ 4. Definite descriptions and proper names.

There is a category of expressions whose position in language is closely related to the position of proper names and common nouns ('gold', 'elm', etc.) and which can be used interchangeably with the latter in many contexts, expressions of the form 'the so-and-so', ('the President of the United States in 1972', 'the element which has atomic number 79', etc.) called by Russell 'definite descriptions'.

Definite descriptions fail, we may note, to designate rigidly: Napoleon might have won the battle of Waterloo. That is, there are possible worlds (as they say) in which the referent of 'the victor at Waterloo' was Napoleon, but there/other possible worlds - as we know - in which this expression designates gentry other than Napoleon. But we may note also that definite descriptions fail to designate rigidly in another, epistemological sense (they are, in the terminology of analytic philosophy, opaque).

Imagine what might be called an epistemically bare context relative to the subject-matter of, say, French constitutional history. This will be a context in which any subject who instantiates it will know, for expressions such as

(a) 'the queen of France in 1776',
(b) 'the queen of France in 1976',

etc.,

only the meanings of individual constituent words and the grammatical formation-rules involved. Now no subject qualified to enter into a context of the given type, that is, no subject disqualified to enter into any epistemically richer context, will have any relevant object as the referent of any act of (correctly) using or understanding any expression of the given type. But not everyone on all occasions displays ignorance of French constitutional history. That is, there are other contexts in which such expressions do possess epistemologically rigid designations or possess, as we shall say, transparent senses. The expression (a) above, for example, would have a transparent sense, when used correctly, in the context of courtly discussions of the given period, a sense which will be identical with the transparent sense which is possessed by 'Marie Antoinette' in the same courtly contexts.
As noted in §§ 2 and 3 above, there are certain ill-consequences which arise from the supposition that the meaning of a given term is identical amongst different speakers of a given linguistic community. We can now point to one further ill-effect of this belief, namely that it generates the further belief that a conception of proper names is necessary or desirable, according to which the latter are viewed as synonymous with particular suitably-formed definite descriptions. For proper names, like 'I', 'she', 'it', seem to betray openly their epistemological context-sensitivity in a way which does not apply to e.g.: 'inventor', 'steam', 'engine', or: 'winged', 'horse', 'sprung from', 'gorgon', etc. The latter can reasonably be presumed to possess a common meaning throughout the whole of a given linguistic community at any particular stage, where quite the opposite is the case for proper names (consider e.g. Shakespeare's 'W.H.', or Frege's 'Dr Gustav Lauben', (Ged., p.65, Klemke, ed., p.517)). The definite description theory of proper names, therefore, holds that 'Aristotle', for example, is synonymous with some complex expression which, for the purposes of the present argument, we might suppose begins: 'the Stagirite philosopher who taught Alexander and was taught by Plato...'. Ignoring, for the moment, the fact that such a definite description will itself have a context-sensitive meaning, there is still the serious difficulty for such a view that no matter how carefully the given description has been chosen, it seems that it would always be conceivable that we should discover, at some later stage, that certain features built into the description were false of the referent in question. We may discover, for example, that Aristotle - the very same Hellenic philosopher and teacher of Alexander - was not, after all, born in Stagira. One possible solution to this kind of difficulty would be to argue, as above, that users of 'Aristotle' before and after the discovery of his non-Stagirite status were speaking different languages in the relevant area of language-use. The discovery would tell us that the original language had been semantically or descriptively inadequate to the world which it had been constructed to describe. But such an approach, whilst formally adequate, clearly underestimates the extent to which meanings
are sensitive, from our point of view, to even the smallest variations in context (and in associated acts), by falsely assuming that it is possible to ascribe exact and exhaustive meanings to proper names, meanings which would apply throughout a given stage in our accumulation and disaccumulation of knowledge concerning their bearers.

Recognition of this inadequacy has led to the development of amended versions of the definite descriptional thesis concerning the meanings of proper names, which attempt to take account of this context-sensitivity. According to these versions the relation of synonymy between name and complex-description is replaced by a weaker relation according to which, in any given use of the name it is not the whole of the description which is at stake, but only some selection of the features which it contains. It is claimed, merely, that the meaning involved in any given use of the name must involve a somehow sufficiently high proportion of the features involved.

This kind of account certainly captures some of the structure of the totality of meanings which may be possessed by a given proper name in its various contexts of use. And there seem to be some proper names (such as 'St Anne' about whose referent it is known only that she is the mother of Mary) for which all contexts of use seem to be contexts in which a descriptional analysis of meaning might be appropriate. But it seems very questionable whether the descriptional approach can succeed, even in its amended versions, in capturing in full the structure of the totality of meanings determined by more run-of-the-mill proper names such as 'Willard Quine'. I may, for example, be bodily introduced to some animal by, 'Shake hands, this is Daisy the cow', such that I can thereafter use 'Daisy' correctly in certain contexts, despite having no knowledge of any non-trivial enduring features possessed by the cow in question, features which may be candidates for positions in any complex descriptional meaning of her name. It does not seem, either, that the meaning of 'Daisy' as employed by me in such contexts could be interpreted as some private descriptional meaning such as that of: 'the cow I met yesterday who eyed me wearily'. For my use of 'Daisy' simply does
not have the discursive character which would be implied by any descriptional or broadly featural meaning being involved in such use. It seems, rather, to be characterised by a peculiar transparency relative to Daisy herself, whom I have by the tail, so to speak, ever since my first encounter. This transparency may survive even in the face of incorrect applications of featural meanings: if, for example, I am introduced to Daisy by 'this is Daisy, Farmer Brown's favourite cow', then even should it be the case that Daisy is neither owned nor well-liked by Farmer Brown, and that there are therefore incorrect featural components in meanings possessed by 'Daisy' on subsequent occasions on which I use this term, it will still be the case that it will be to Daisy herself to whom I refer on those occasions. There seems, what is more, to be no limit to the degree of featural incorrectness which such transparency can withstand. (We must assume, of course, that the initial introduction or 'baptism' (Kripke) is itself phenomenologically acceptable: 'meet Mr Gladstone, the transcendental number', for example, does not meet this condition.)

Recall the Russell-Moore approach to the theory of meaning mentioned above, according to which the meaning of a sentence contains amongst its constituents the objects denoted by proper names which figure in the sentence. One advantage of this theory is that it explains - in a peculiarly vivid way - how it comes about that language gears in with and succeeds in being 'about' the real world in which we live. Russell and Moore were correct, we believe, in holding that the principle area of connection between language and the world is provided by proper names (and closely related variant expressions, including certain simple property-denoting expressions), but wrong in supposing that to account for this connection one has to assume that the referents of such privileged expressions are themselves constituents of their meanings. The meaning of a name for a certain context has not the referent itself as a constituent, we shall argue, but rather a constituent of transparency relative to that referent. The full meaning is then transparent in the sense that anyone who succeeds in actualising that meaning has the relevant object as his
referent. Thus it appears that the term 'transparency' is ambiguous, since it
denotes both (i) an 'external' property of certain meanings, and (ii) an 'internal'
constituent of those same meanings. It might be thought that the second
meaning here, and with it all commitment to dubious 'constituents' of mean-
ings, was superfluous in that all of the data involved could be sufficiently
explained by the fact that certain terms have meanings which are 'transparent'
in the sense that they possess the property that they share a common referent.
This again would be to turn away from what is beneficial in the 'idea' theory
of meaning, that it explains how meanings can play a role in our actual
cognitive experience: The constituent of transparency is indispensable, as
we shall see, if we are to explain how I can mean Aristotle himself by my use
of 'Aristotle' and not some other Stagirite.

The acceptability of the descriptional approach to proper names amongst
many philosophers of the recent past derives, at least in part, from a mistaken
approach to the problem of identifying and re-identifying objects of reference
(the bearers of names of this type). It is an approach which rests on the
supposition that we re-identify, for example, people, by running though certain
features which they possess and collating these with features which we know
them to have possessed on previous inspections. In this respect every sit-
uation is a 'possible world' from the point of view of (knowledge-gaining)
situations in the past. Hence it is that this same 'featural' model of re-
identification re-appears on a much larger scale in the presentation of the
so-called problem of 'trans-world identity', of identifying who (if anyone)
in some given world is identical with, say, Napoleon in the present world.
The problem as stated rests on the supposition that to draw such lines of
identity one must as it were 'survey' the array of objects to be found on more
or less 'distant' worlds (as if they were cows in a distant field) recognising
the qualities or features which they manifest as combining together, more or
less as on this actual world, to constitute individual objects having qual-
ities or features in common with certain identifiable members of the actual
world. It is the possibility of perfect featural coincidence which, it is
argued, justifies the drawing of lines of identity at all.¹⁹

Kripke's work suggests, however, that the whole model of 'featural survey' (of reidentifying objects as targets for acts) is inadequate, either as an account of how we gain 'knowledge' about non-actual worlds, or, more importantly, as an account of our knowledge of acquaintances and public figures (and, of course, objects of other types) on this, actual world. For possible worlds, it must be recognised, are given only by specification; it would not only be a gross metaphysical presumption to suppose that a single totality of all possible worlds could exist fully blown, awaiting exploration by intrepid modal logicians: the very notion of such a totality is, as we shall see in our discussion of Meinong's philosophy below, an inconsistent notion. The specifications on the basis of which we may create or 'generate' some limited totality of possible worlds will, in general, employ proper names. The world \( W_c \), for example, will be determined as a world identical with the actual world except that in it President Nixon (his very self) has large and bushy eyebrows. No problems can arise in the re-identification of Nixon in a world so specified, for our very ability to operate with and make sense of the given specification presupposes that we fix Nixon himself as our referent from beginning to end of the process (of world- 'abstraction') involved.

The extent to which featural survey plays a logically inferior role also in our everyday experience of more mundane objects may be stated by appealing, once again, to Putnam's notion of a linguistic division of labour. It is my structured cooperation with various clerics, passport officers, record-keepers and, eventually, obituary-writers, to which (in the end) I must appeal when I make serious use of your name. And it is my structured cooperation with various museum-keepers, encyclopedia-compilers, and with those who have time to read detective novels, to which I must appeal when I make serious use of the names of Nantup, of Nippur, and of Sherlock. That is to say, to make serious use of your or of Sherlock's name, is to make use of it transparently,
that is with the (fulfilled) intention to refer to just this particular object. What is remarkable is the extent to which such intentions can be fulfilled, the extent to which our use of a proper name or of a common noun is correct use, even against a background of an almost limitless variety of meanings which may be associated with each such term. This is not least remarkable, of course, in the case of reference to Sherlock and his ilk. It is perhaps insufficiently realised that we have standards of correctness for the application of 'Sherlock' which are quite comparable with the corresponding standards for, say, 'Kripke' or 'Caligula' or 'Cantor's IIInd number class'.
§5. Meaning-hierarchies.

The fact that the actualised meanings associated with particular linguistic expressions vary with epistemically relevant variations in their context of use, and that, in particular, they may vary - as we shall see in more detail when the phenomenology of meaning is discussed - with the smallest variations in the cognitive content contributed by the subject or subjects involved, does not imply that there is no possibility of a systematic investigation of such meanings. For, even, does it rule out the possibility of devising notions of linguistic meaning ('canonical meaning', see Ch.6 below) according to which expressions may be ascribed unique meanings, conceived as playing a determinative role on all occasions of use: the danger is merely that these latter may resolve themselves into abstract constructions imposed retrospectively.

The systematic interrelations of all such actualised meanings and, above all, their arrangement into hierarchies, will be a persistent theme of the chapters which follow. Thus the brief discussion of such hierarchies which we offer here for certain types of linguistic expressions only, will have to serve the purpose of providing an archetype for parallel discussions which, in any full development of the theories involved, would need to be offered in each of those later chapters for the meaning-entities there discussed.

Meanings may, first of all, be divided into 'correct' and 'incorrect'. Incorrect meanings arise when mistakes of varying degrees of triviality are made in the use of associated expressions. These need not necessarily be mistakes for which the subject using or understanding a particular incorrect meaning on a given occasion is responsible: mistakes may be inherited. Incorrect meanings may be important, e.g. in discussions of improper definite descriptions where only incorrect meanings seem, at least for some purposes, to be employable. Here, however, we shall confine our attention to 'correct' meanings.

Let us consider the hierarchy of correct meanings associated with a
proper name such as 'Aristotle'. The proponents of the modified description theory argue, laudably, that it is possible to isolate a series of linguistically expressible features which may be involved, on different occasions of use, in actualised meanings of this term. The logic of descriptions is then used to determine a particular hierarchy of composite meanings which can be built up from out of these features. What results when the constituent of 'transparency' (with respect to Aristotle) is introduced is something of a structural approximation to the hierarchy of meanings associable with 'Aristotle' (in contexts not involving mistaken uses of this term). Let us suppose, somewhat simplistically, that Aristotle is someone for whom we can isolate only three features, which we may symbolise by means of one-place predicates. The supposition is simplistic since such features are determined by every element in the narrative account which we have, or could easily construct, of Aristotle's life (social and intellectual). The hierarchy which results then has the form of:

Here 'T' indicates the purely transparent meaning for 'Aristotle', 'T
indicates a transparent meaning for 'Aristotle' which carries the featural component symbolised by 'A, and may be read: 'T, which is A,'; (e.g., Aristotle, who was the pupil of Plato'), and so on for each of the other nodes of the diagram, 'A,A' symbolising 'A, and A,'; etc.

Modified description theorists confine themselves to the question (which, as we shall see, ignores all of the true difficulties involved): what are the components of such a hierarchy which can qualify as meanings for 'Aristotle'. Only some components qualify, they argue, namely those
which are obtained from a 'sufficiently high' proportion of features on the (full) list. Given the recognition of a constituent of transparency in the meanings of names, however, such deliberations reveal themselves as beside the point. For one can conceive of contexts in which, say, 'Aristotle' is used in such a way that it is associated with only a single feature, which would be quite insufficient, with regard to contexts in general, to individuate the object in question; Not for nothing was Aquinas, for example, wont to characterise Aristotle as 'the philosopher'.

There are also certain purely transparent meanings for 'Aristotle' constructed on the basis of a zero number of features, and we can conceive of meanings for 'Aristotle' which are constructed on the basis of a large number of features which are incorrect, yet in such a way that reference is preserved. Thus consider the following pair of examples:

(i) John, who is ignorant of Greek philosophy, is skimming through an Encyclopedia, seeking information about Aristobulus of Panas, when his attention lands, momentarily and with a glimmer of interest, on the name 'Aristotle'.

(ii) John, again, is skimming through the same Encyclopedia seeking information on Aristotle himself, and his awareness of the task before him is such that reference to Aristotle is secured. Nonetheless he somehow succeeds in mistakenly absorbing the article on Aristobulus.

These two examples serve to illustrate the importance for the theory of meaning of what might be called the non-featural dimension, elements of which are, as we shall see, constitutive of all actualised meanings. The presence of such elements is sufficient to render hierarchies such as the above, determined by linguistically expressible components alone, valueless when put forward in their own right to support any full account of the meanings involved. Such schemata have a clarificatory value only if they are consciously employed as structural skeletons of more adequate (though also, of course, incomparably more complex) hierarchies of the type which would be necessary in any complete account.

We are assuming that both meanings of 'Aristotle' in (i) and (ii) above are transparent, in that John, who is admittedly at a highly novitiate stage in the study of philosophy, is nevertheless referring to Aristotle himself in
the intention of the term: compare Putnam's beech/elm example on p. 10 above.

We can exploit this assumption to open up a distinction between transparency and correctness which will be of some importance in the arguments which follow. The meaning involved in (i) is, we might say, empty of content. Thus for example it is not decomposable into constituent meanings, it can be neither 'confused' nor 'non-confused', and it can give its object neither distinctly nor non-distinctly. It is, nevertheless, a correct meaning. In the second case however the meaning of 'Aristotle' is rich in content, it is discursive and decomposable into parts, it is non-confused and it gives its object clearly, though not, e.g. with perceptual fulfilment (we are assuming that John does not have the benefit of an artist's impression of Aristobulus). In this second case however the meaning involved is, despite its transparency to Aristotle, incorrect.

There is an obvious analytic ploy which might be thought to account for cases such as this without the need for any distinctions of the type which we, drawing from Husserl, have made above. This is to view an act such as that involved in (i), where John lights fleetingly on 'Aristotle', as an act of reference not to Aristotle but to 'Aristotle', i.e. to the linguistic expression, either as token or as type. Clearly this would be the correct view to take of certain acts of roughly the given type: John may work for the encyclopedia company as a proof-reader. It would be more typical, however, that the correct view of such an act, as of all language-carried acts, would involve both a stratum involving reference to the terms in question and a stratum of 'ordinary' reference. But is there really an advantage for the analytic philosopher if he can press home his own interpretation for all such acts? The advantage which he claims is the advantage of 'semantic ascent', that it allows a purely featural interpretation of the meaning involved (a meaning of 'Aristotle', now, rather than of 'Aristotle') as identical with the meaning of, say: 'the word consisting of the 1st, 18th, 9th, 19th, 20th, 15th, 20th, 12th and 5th letters of the Roman alphabet, in that order'. The 'non-featural dimension' cannot be so easily eliminated however, for such an interpretation must fail to take account of the fact that the meaning involved in (i) is, as we have said, 'empty of content': the 'atomic', single-rayed, non-discursive nature
of that act as something which it possesses even though its object (whether this be Aristotle or 'Aristotle') is of a relatively complex nature. Only by breaking out of the purely featural meaning-hierarchy can the ever-recurring possibility (which is indispensable e.g. to the advance of theoretical knowledge) of a single-rayed act, a bare 'hinge for thought' (Smith, 1975, p.96 line 2) involving successful reference to a complex entity, be acknowledged.

Thus it begins to be clear why the structural hierarchy displayed on p.25 can be an approximation only: There is an infinite degree of contextual, subject-contributed complexity which actualised meanings as such must always possess, and not all of this complexity is reflected in any linguistically expressible distinctions which could be built into a new, featural hierarchy in such a way as to produce a less approximate model. The structural hierarchies which can be created are of some use in the development of a rigorous act-based theory of meaning - but only if we keep account of the radical simplifications which they involve. The most important of these are:

(i) as we have already seen, the non-featural dimension is ignored, a dimension which contains the axes of clarity/unclarity, discursivity/non-discursivity (and its close relation: multi-rayedness/single-rayedness), fulfilment (e.g. perceptual or imaginative fulfilment)/non-fulfilment, centrality (in one's field of attention)/non-centrality, and so on. Each variation along any of these axes yields a precisely correlated variation in the meaning involved; from the point of view of theory, therefore, a complete analysis becomes an immense but not, fortunately, an impossible task.

(ii) we ignore the fact that, as was recognised by the proponents of the modified description theory, features involved in any given meaning-hierarchy exhibit various different 'weightings', different propensities to combine with each other, and so on.

(iii) what we cannot ignore, in any full presentation of the theory, is that the component meanings of any given hierarchy will themselves more properly be represented as falling into their own hierarchies of context-dep-
endent actualised meanings, interrelated in certain highly complex ways with any given 'skeletal' hierarchy under review. Given our current interest in the meanings of names it is reasonable, perhaps, that we have left unanalysed the constituent featural meanings (of various types) which a given nominal meaning may involve. In some cases the incorporation of a hierarchical analysis, e.g. of a feature attachable to transparent meanings of 'Aristotle' such as 'spoke with a lisp' can be effected unproblematically (compare the mathematical of lattice-theoretic multiplication), but this is by no means always the case. Perhaps the most important problem which may arise is a consequence of the fact that many attachable meanings will be 'featural' only in an honorific sense, since they will themselves involve proper names (such as 'France', 'Stagira', even 'Roman alphabet') each of which will have its associated nominal meaning-hierarchy. The obvious implication is that certain hierarchies will involve pockets of vicious circularity; (John's habitual meaning of 'Aristotle' will include the feature taught by Plato, and his habitual meaning of 'Plato' the feature teacher of Aristotle), and circularities of this sort are not always eliminable. This kind of linguistic brinkmanship, in which one meaning is traded off against one or more other meanings on an equivalent level, against the day when one or other of the terms involved will acquire an independent lower-level meaning and thus break the circle, is both widespread and indispensable for thought. Thus my 26 meaning of 'Eddie Hercx' has the dominant feature frequent winner of the Tour de France cycle race, and my meaning of 'Tour de France' the feature cycle race frequently won by Eddie Hercx. Under normal conditions I am content to let these two meanings spin happily together, despite the almost total hiatus which separates them from 'well-founded' meanings in my possession. Only when I meet Hercx in a railway carriage does the circle yield its value. All learning seems to consist in the establishment of such pockets of circularity (normally with a large number of interdependent terms involved), the circles operative at any given stage being broken as we come to understand, at least in part, the terms involved and to grasp their relationships,
and new circles becoming established as we move on in the attempt to grasp concepts at the next higher level. Compare, for example, the description given by Mill in his Autobiography of his first lessons in logic:

> The explanations did not make the matter at all clear to me at the time; but they were not therefore useless; they remained as a nucleus for my observations and reflections to crystallise upon; the import of the general remarks being interpreted to me, by the particular instances which came under my notice afterwards. (5th ed., 1875, p.18f)

Again, the existence of such vicious circularities makes the full theory of meanings difficult, but not impossible: metamathematical considerations reveal that unfoundedness of the given kind as applied to object-entities such as sets leads to contradictions in the associated theory, but such considerations cannot be applied, as will become clear, to totalities of meaning-entities.27

There is one final simplification built into the schematic hierarchies considered above which we must briefly refer to, namely

(iv) that such hierarchies fail to take account of distinctions between those components of a meaning which are actually meant in a given actualisation, and those which are merely potentially meant with varying degrees of potentiality. Only if we take account of the possibility of features being associated with a given transparent meaning which are all purely potential can we explain the possibility of absolutely simple, densely-packed 'lightings' of meaning (as illustrated on p. 26 above) intending entities of great complexity. Every meaning contains within itself both actual and potential components, just as every perceptual act intends not only the objects which are actually 'seen' in the centre of our perceptual field but also those peripheral objects which are emptily co-given on the horizon of that field as themselves potential objects of attention. Thus, as Ingarden writes:

> The meaning of the word "square" contains in its material content actually only part of what is contained in the concept of a square or in the idea of "the square"; in contrast the meaning of the expression "equilateral rectangular parallelogram" contains actually a different part of the content of the same concept... Further, both of these meanings contain, though now in a totally different, potential way, something which is also contained in the ideal concept of a square, namely, that the sides of a square can be of "any absolute length". (LWA, §16, p.87).
And the same opposition applies not only to general meanings but also e.g. to
the meanings of proper names of particular objects such as Aristotle. For
example, given a certain background of (earthly) geographical knowledge
every intention of 'Aristotle' contains, at least as a potential component,
the feature is a Stagirite. The feature is a Greek occurs in all such meanings
with a relatively higher degree of potentiality. Finally the feature comes from
somehow or other figures with the highest degree of potentiality (short of
actually) since it is part of the (potential) meaning of 'human being' that
human beings have determinate origins. Such examples reveal a further feature
of all meaning-entities (from the meanings of individual words up to the
level of whole theories, considered as systems of sentence-meanings) that they
contain both constant and variable components (Cf. Ingarden, StEW,II/1,231-63).
Thus it is a constant component of the meaning of 'table' that it have
a flat surface, that it be solid, etc., that it have a certain size and be
made of a certain material, etc., but which size and which material are
left variable - within certain limits (which themselves form part of the
constant component of the meaning involved).28 It will be an important
element of our case in defense of the absolute ontological dichotomy between
meaning-entities and object-entities that this constant/variable opposition
can never be applied to objects as such (nor to properties of individual
objects, to states of affairs involving such objects, to events, processes,
and so on). Thus the 'loci of indeterminacy' referred to above as being
possessed by the objects of fiction are not at all to be confused with
the 'variables' built into the content of a meaning-entity (though this is
not to say that there will be no relations between the two dimensions: it is
a consequence of the fact that Shakespeare mentions 'hair' in Rosencrantz's
speeches and not e.g. 'red hair' that there is a corresponding indeterminacy
of colour in the hair 'possessed' by Hamlet. The loci of indeterminacy with
respect to Hamlet's adventures as an infant are not, however, to be correl-
ated with meaning-variations laid down by Shakespeare.)

Perhaps this is the place to return to consider our claims to the effect
that 'Holmes', 'Hamlet', 'Hekate'...are to be characterized as 'epistemologic-
ally rigid designators. These claims now resolve themselves into the concept of each such term as having a constituent of 'transparency' (relative to its referent), which is involved in all meanings associated with it in contexts where transparency relative to that referent is not 'cancelled' by a pre-established constituent of transparency relative to a different referent. Such cancellation, which is comparatively rare, occurs, e.g. when John, a cycle-racing fanatic, is introduced at a party to 'Eddie Mercx', and goes away proud at having met his hero, not knowing that it was a different, e.g. wooden-legged Eddie Mercx whom he met. It is such prior intentions which can alone generate incorrect meanings in the sense which is relevant here. Thus we are suggesting that a term such as 'Aristotle' or 'Anna Karenina' functions transparently in every context in which its use does not involve meaning-constituents derived from prior, potentially incorrect uses of the term.

More generally: all logically simple denoting expressions (and here we must include not only proper names and common nouns but also certain simple property denoting expressions of the type indicated in §41 below), function transparently in all contexts in which their use does not rest upon incorrect constituents of the type discussed. Someone may be disposed to doubt this claim by arguing that there are contexts where even ordinary proper names may function correctly yet non-transparently. 'Louis XV', for example, functions non-transparently as employed by the grandmother of Marie Antoinette when she utters, 'A grand-daughter of mine will marry Louis XV, whoever he may be.' That this term functions non-transparently here expresses itself in the fact that its use can have no epistemological 'guarantee' that a referent for the given expression will ever exist. But this example is not a counter-example to our claim, since 'Louis XV' clearly functions in the given context in such a way as to have a logically complex form, the form of 'the XVth Louis'.

It is a consequence of our claim, indeed, that the only proper names which could have non-transparent meanings are names which are completely referentless; names used, for example, in hoaxes or in acts of fraud. For such 'hoax-names' it is important to distinguish between two levels: an ('internal') level on which the names are used, that is to say by the executors of the hoax...
and by their victim. And also an ('external') level of 2nd-order discourse about use. On the first level, of course, none of the contexts involved is such that the hoax-name is used in such a way as to denote successfully, and nor can it be used in such contexts except in a way which rests on some kind of mistake or mistaken supposition. On the second level it is a familiar analytic philosophical truism that the hoax-name itself is not used at all but merely mentioned: We do not say, 'His readers were hoaxed into believing that Mantup was a Sumerian hedge-priest,' but rather that they were 'hoaxed into believing that "Mantup" was the name of a Sumerian hedge-priest.' Such 'second-order discourse' occurs also with respect to fictional objects: Conan Doyle created Holmes, Ernest Jones psychoanalysed Hamlet, the Swaphan strangler imitated Raskolnikov, and so on. Analytic philosophers attempt to assimilate the semantic structure of such discourse to that of discourse involving hoax-names. We shall claim, in contrast, that the logic or semantical structure of such discourse, and of all discourse about 'admissible' non-existent and higher-order objects is, in an interesting and important sense, perfectly parallel to the logic of discourse about existent objects (where no distinction between first and second-order discourse is reflected in the referents of the terms involved). To justify this semantic claim, however, it is ontological investigations which will be required.
We have attempted to show that, whilst Frege did not go far enough in absorbing the lessons of his insight into the epistemological basis of the theory of meaning, he nevertheless succeeded in providing what is a structurally correct account, which involves, in particular, the possibility of a meaningful term which lacks a referent. It is to be regretted, therefore, that he failed to incorporate the insights of his sense-reference dichotomy within his own, independently developed, ontological theory. There have been some recent attempts by, for example, Bergmann and his followers, to supplement Frege's work in the relevant direction, but these have met with little success. (This is shown by Thiel in his (1967) discussion of "Entitätsentfältn" [Tables of Entities]). Where success has been achieved is in the work by Dummett in extending and refining the epistemological insights which underlie Frege's semantics. Unfortunately the linguistic-philosophical stance taken by Dummett in his work on Frege (see especially his 1973 study of Frege's philosophy of language, hereafter referred to as FPL) means that he succeeds in clarifying only the operational aspects of Frege's theory, and not the ontological status of the entities involved. Indeed Dummett puts forward the view that what is of crucial importance for the theory of meaning is neither the notion of significance (the determination of which linguistic constructions are meaningful) nor the notion of synonymy (the problem of providing identity criteria for senses - closely related to the problem of providing an ontological account of such entities) but rather the purely operational notion of knowing the meaning of. Thus for Dummett, in effect, 'a theory of meaning is a theory of understanding' (FPL, p. 92). Only on the basis of a fully worked-out theory of what it is to understand linguistic expressions - of what this highly complex ability consists in - can we go on to develop in a systematic way the theories of significance and of synonymy, and then eventually - though Dummett throws no light on this matter - develop an ontology of senses. This is, as we shall see, to put the cart before the horse.
For in failing to meet the challenge of specifying the peculiar ontological structure which must be possessed by meanings or senses if they are to embody the 'cognitive value' of corresponding expressions, both Frege and Dummett thereby fail also to provide an account of meanings as such at all. What they do provide - and this with some success - is a model of the role which meaning plays e.g. in theoretical contexts. But the extent to which such a model contains features which pertain to the model alone and not to the contexts themselves, can be determined only by means of an independent descriptive investigation of that which is given in the cognitive experiences which form our sole source of knowledge concerning such contexts, an investigation in which we are 'led by the hand of the things themselves'.

Dummett, in particular, has provided no serious account of how senses - which, like Frege, he conceives as abstract entities - can play any role in the non-abstract cognitive experience of actual subjects. He is aware of the absence of such an account, both in his own work and in that of Frege, but argues pragmatically that this need not represent a failing of the Fregean approach since

for Frege the sense of an expression is the manner in which we determine its reference, and Frege tells us a great deal about the kinds of reference possessed by expressions of different types, thereby specifying the form that the senses of such expressions must take... Even if we cannot say what a sense is, there is no obstacle to our saying what it is that someone can do when he grasps that sense, and this is all that we need the notion of sense for. (FPL, 227).

Thus for Dummett the task of the theory of meaning is the task of determining what the model should be for the notion of knowing the sense of an expression: the general form of description, for expressions of each logical type, of what it is that a man knows when he knows the sense of an expression of that type. (FPL, 229).

But such a collection of dispositional descriptions provides no insight into what is the case when someone knows or grasps a sense, and how an abstract entity of the given kind can play a part in his cognitive experience.
It merely replaces the initial problem of determining what is the case when someone grasps a sense, with a series of particular problems, of equal difficulty, of determining what is the case when someone knows the sense of a proper name, of a predicate, of a functional expression, and so on.

As a first step in the direction of a deeper analysis let us recall our claim to the effect that the theory of sense and reference may be viewed, with some caution, as founded on what might be called a principle of 'intellectual apartheid', according to which meanings are distinguished as constituting an isolated realm, broadly identifiable as Frege's 'realm of senses'. Much work has to be done before we can justify the drawing of any ontological demarcation line between such a 'realm' and a suitably determined realm of 'object'-entities. Difficulties arise, in particular, in virtue of the existence of contexts in which meanings or senses themselves seem to play the role of transcendent objects. This occurs, for example, when they function as the referents of terms of semantics itself, by means of constructions of the form: 'the meaning of the word "rabbit"', and so on, with which we began.

In fact for Frege every entity is a referent; more precisely: every entity is the potential referent of some suitably formed expression. Thus to acknowledge the status of senses as fully-fledged entities is already to acknowledge their status as referents. On the basis of such considerations some latter-day followers of Frege have wanted to go further even than Dummett — with his denial that the problem of ontological status of senses is of any crucial importance — by advancing the stronger claim that any ontological interpretation of Fregean semantics must break down. Thiel, for example, argues that 'to be sign, sense or reference is only a role' which certain entities take on when they enter, in different ways, into semantic contexts (S&R, 154), and that 'there is no justification for talking in semantics of "spheres", "realms", etc.' (loc. cit.). Indeed Thiel holds

the Fregean allowance of a participation of ontology in the doctrine of sense and reference for a completely unacceptable
contamination. (S&R, 151 f.)

We hope to show that such conclusions are unwarranted. Certainly the simple
sense-reference dichotomy has, as it stands, no ontological significance. But
if we can show that there is a quite peculiar ontological structure which must
be possessed by any entity which is to fulfill the function exercised by senses,
then we shall be able to formulate an ontological interpretation of Frege's sem-
antics, a first approximation to which may be expressed in terms of a distinction
between

(i) entities which have the ontological structure which would make
it possible, in appropriate conditions, for them to serve as
senses,

and

(ii) 'objects' or 'ordinary referents' which do not possess such

a structure.

As is recognised by Thiel, Frege's own writings contain the germ of such an
ontological interpretation of his semantic theory, for Frege frequently speaks,
especially in his later works, of a 'realm of sense', a 'realm of reference',
and even of a 'realm of word and sentence'. (See Ged, passim, 1918/19a, esp.
p.132, for further references see S&R, p.150 f.) Here the 'realm of sense'
is viewed as forming a part of the realm of reference, that is to say, of
the intersubjective reality to which our thoughts are directed (or are di-
rectable). But then, as Dummett recognises,

the realm of sense is a very special region of reality; its
denizens are, so to speak, things of a very special sort.
(FPL, 154, cf. also pp.174,177,442).

As we shall see, there are certain elements of Frege's own ontological theory
which can be exploited to throw useful, though indirect, light on this 'special
nature' of senses, but for an adequate positive account of the nature of meanings
in general we shall need to turn, in the chapters which follow, to the work of
phenomenologists such as Husserl and Ingarden.
17. Frege as ontologist (1) The function-object ontology and its modifications

We have advanced a claim to the effect that an adequate ontology of meaning-entities could be obtained on the basis of Frege's theory of sense and reference. Here we wish to argue that Frege himself had grasped, in germ, the insights essential to such an ontology - but they are insights which can be extracted only with great care from those of his writings which are explicitly concerned with ontological issues. These writings fall into two groups, belonging to two different periods in Frege's philosophical career. The later group (Frege's "Logical Investigations", that is to say: Ged (1918/19), 1918/19a, and 1925/26), where Frege concerns himself with the opposition between (what are, in his terms) 'subjective' and 'objective' entities, we shall need to concern ourselves with only later. Here we devote our attention to Frege's earlier writings which contain his more familiar contribution to ontology: the distinction between objects and functions, a distinction which serves as a presupposition for all his later works.

The cornerstone of Frege's early ontology consists of the claim that all entities can be divided into two disjoint categories:

(i) the category of objects, whose members are the referents of 'complete' (or 'saturated', 'gesättigt') expressions such as proper names, definite descriptions and even, for Frege, whole sentences. The referents of such 'complete' expressions are themselves characterised, by analogy, as 'complete' or 'saturated'.

(ii) the category of functions, which consists of all 'incomplete' expressions which are - again by analogy - themselves said to be 'incomplete' or 'unsaturated'. Paradigm examples of this second category are mathematical functions such as the cosine or the square root function. But Frege held that, since expressions such as 'capital city of' function in just the same way as do mathematical functional expressions in that when applied to one name (say 'Denmark') they yield, in appropriate instances, a second name, ('Copenhagen'), these expressions also must be ascribed entities, functional entities,
as their referents. Having taken this step, Frege effected a further
generalisation by regarding all 'incomplete' expressions in precisely this
manner. 'Is a planet', for example, Frege viewed as denoting a function from
objects to truth values. The value of this function for the argument
Venus will be truth, and for the argument Napoleon, falsehood. The term
'concept' was used by Frege precisely to denote functions of this sort,
and thus for Frege the category of concepts is distinguished as a sub-
category of the category of functions. A similar account is given of relation-
al expressions such as 'is taller than', which Frege identified as
denoting functions from ordered pairs of objects to truth values, functions
which he called relations. Note also that the function-object theory is
further complicated by the need to recognise functional expressions of a
higher order, for example, the expression 'for some ( )' which, when
applied to the expression 'is a planet' yields a 'name of the truth' (i.e.,
the sentence: 'for some x, x is a planet').

We have seen that for Frege functional expressions are distinguished
as having functional entities as their referents, and that in particular
concepts are distinguished as the referents of conceptual expressions (one-
place predicates such as 'is a planet'). There is something unsettling in
such an account as applied to concepts. Dummett has suggested that the
peculiarity may arise for linguistic reasons: 'In English', though not,
he suggests, in Frege's original German, 'we should naturally interpret a
"concept" as being that which a person possesses when he grasps the sense
of a word or range of words' (FPL, 173). Dummett concludes that a more
natural interpretation of Frege's 'Begriff' may be 'property' rather than
'concept', and this is supported by passages where Frege tells us that he
calls 'the concepts under which an object falls, its properties' (1892a,p.51). But even then it is unnatural to say that an incomplete expression such as
'is a horse' refers to the property of being a horse. This unnaturalness
arises in virtue of our tacit acceptance of the principle that signs refer
only in so far as they are intended as referring, one consequence of which
is that it becomes impossible to justify the claim that incomplete expressions refer at all: not 'cosine( )' but 'the cosine function' is the expression which, on this view, is to be taken as referring to the cosine function as a mathematical entity. Incomplete expressions do however possess senses (meanings) - something which can be acknowledged only against the background of the Fregean, three-term, approach to the theory of meaning - and if we identify concepts as the senses of predicate expressions, or conceive, indeed, of a generalised category of concepts (including now functional and relational concepts) and identify this with the category of senses of incomplete expressions of appropriate types, then the ontological demarcation line between concepts and (Fregean) objects would coincide with our demarcation line between 'entities which may serve as senses' and 'objects' distinguished on p.37 above, somewhat as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>modified Fregean ontology:</th>
<th>category of Fregean objects</th>
<th>category of 'concepts'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ontology of objects/meaning-entities:</td>
<td>category of objects-in-general (of 'ordinary referents')</td>
<td>category of meanings-in-general</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frege was certainly aware of the possibility of identifying concepts as the senses of predicative expressions. This is seen by his (hardly convincing) criticism of Husserl's theory along these lines which Frege seems to have discerned in Husserl's Philosophie der Arithmetik. In a letter to Husserl Frege writes concerning a difference of opinion between the two thinkers as to how

the concept-word (the common name) is related to objects. The following schema may clarify my (i.e. Frege's) view:
In the case of concept-words, one more step is needed than in the case of proper names in order to reach the object, and this last may be missing - i.e., the concept may be empty, without the concept-word ceasing thereby to be scientifically applicable. (Mohanty, ed., Frege-Husserl Correspondence, p. 84, Frege to Husserl of 24 May 1891).

Frege tells us that he has drawn the step from the concept to the object side-ways to indicate that these two entities 'lie on the same level', that they 'have the same objectivity'. (Loc. cit.) This is misleading at the very least, since Frege's senses, which are here denied a place on this level of 'objectivity', were themselves postulated by Frege in order to compensate for what he saw as the inherent 'subjectivity' of Vorstellungen (presentations, ideas). Sense can be made of this passage however, but only if we acknowledge the recognition on Frege's part of the ontological dichotomy between meaning-entities and object-entities defended here; that concepts, objects and truth values all have the same 'objectivity' then comes to mean that they are all (at least in Frege's eyes) 'ordinary referents' - that they are transcendent entities 'out there', which have independent determinations which it is our business to discover.34 Husserl's schema, Frege argues, would look something like this:

```
Concept-word
  ↓ Sense of the concept-word (Concept)
  ↓ Object which falls under the concept.
```

so that, for you [i.e., for Husserl], the same number of steps are...
needed to reach the objects from the concept-words as from the proper names. In that case, the only difference between proper names and concept-words would be that the former could be related to only one object. A concept-word whose concept is empty must then be rejected in the sciences exactly like a proper name to whom there is no corresponding object. (Op.cit. p.85).

Frege's conclusion is, in effect, that in the Husserlian schema concept-words play a role similar to proper names of species, and a species-name which was never instantiated would indeed deserve to be 'rejected in the sciences' just as much as would an empty proper name. However, inspection reveals that this conclusion rests on an additional unexpressed premise on Frege's part, to the effect that Husserlian concepts are, like Fregean concepts, 'objective', that is that they are to be counted as forming as integral and secure a part of the transcendent world as are the mundane objects which fall under them. As we shall see, however, there is an important reason why Husserl - given his cognitive-philosophical approach (see note 3 above) - could not have held such a view of concepts.

Frege's concepts form, indeed, such a secure part of the transcendent world of objects that for many purposes one can come very close to regarding each individual concept as an object. This is because, given Frege's view that every object either does or does not fall under any given concept (tertium non datur), he can associate with every concept a unique and unchanging object, which he calls the Wertverlauf, the value range or extension of the concept. Wertverläufe form another collection of 'denizens of reality of a very special sort'. In fact they form a sub-totality of the realm of the objects, the relation of which to the totality of concepts is so close that there is an effective one-one correspondence between the two, for Frege suggests that concepts and their Wertverläufe should have
individuation conditions in common.\textsuperscript{36}

Any conception of concepts as forming a closed, determinate totality - or any conception which would make such a view even possible to defend - would be totality alien to Husserl, however, as it would be alien to the tradition of philosophy in general. (Compare Angelelli's discussion on p. 63f of his 1967). For Husserl, concepts, the sense of predicate expressions, are effectively creatures of cognition, and the question of determining which, or even how many, objects fall under a given concept makes sense only in respect of some predetermined neighbourhood (not necessarily only in the spatio-temporal sense) all the elements of which are epistemically accessible or surveyable.\textsuperscript{38} A concept (in this epistemological sense) under which no objects fall is now scientifically valueless only if it is known that no objects fall under it, and clearly a science which employed only concepts which were known in advance to be non-empty would hardly get off the ground.

\textit{Addendum on 'Hidden Conceptualism'}:

Frege's view of concepts as, effectively, higher order entities ranged across the world of individual objects and determined, without remainder, by the constitution of that world, may perhaps suggest a grain of truth in the charge that there is a hidden nominalistic component in Frege's ontology. (Klemke, ed. (1968) contains a discussion of this view as proposed by Bergmann in his 1958). On the other hand the fact that (Frege's attack on Husserl notwithstanding) the Fregean concept/object ontology will lend itself so readily to a view of concepts as the senses of predicate expressions may suggest that Frege may be charged also with a hidden conceptualism. For Frege leaves no place in his ontology for independent non-'conceptual' properties and relations, nor indeed for universals (essences, species) in general: each of these categories of entities is replaced by one or other species of concept (or function) which are 'universal' only in a highly honorific sense. (Cf. Angelelli, 1967, p. 47).

But now if the latter come to be viewed as senses, i.e. as cognitive formations dependent only upon the 'cognitive value' of particular sentences to particular
linguistic communities, it follows that those constituents of Fregean ontology which play the role of universals also come to be identified as cognitive formations. Thus even if, in the resultant (modified) Fregean framework universals are not created by thought, they are at least such that they exist only to the extent that they are actualised by thought.

The view of concepts as senses which is defended in the present work has played a significant role in the writings of phenomenologists. This must not be taken to imply, however, that phenomenology in general, and this work in particular, may justly be charged with the same 'hidden conceptualism', the edges of which are skirted by our 'modified' Frege. This is because, as was first seen by Hering (1921) and fully demonstrated by Ingarden in his mammoth work on the problem of the existence of the world (StEW), it is possible to allow a place within a phenomenological ontology both for concepts and for transcendent properties, relations and other species of universal. The extent to which Husserl himself suffered from a 'conceptualism' of the type discussed is less easy to decide. In his Logische Untersuchungen, for example, the term 'property' is conspicuous by its absence, although there is, running through that work, a deep realist commitment. The most serious problems occur with Husserl's later phenomenology which by-passed the work of Hering and Ingarden as Husserl drew further and further away from the ontologically-minded Göttingen and Munich phenomenologists until, with his theory of constitutive phenomenology the very boundary between thought-dependent entities and transcendent, autonomous entities (whether particular or universal) is called into question.
§ 7. Frege as ontologist: (2) The ontology of 'realms'

In his later ontological works Frege puts forward an ontology based on a division of entities into three realms (see, in particular, p. 523 of Gege et passim) which, following Thiel (S&R, p. 151) we may express as follows:

1. the subjective real realm, consisting of ideas and combinations of ideas considered as private mental images,

2. the objective non-real realm, consisting of platonistically conceived thoughts and senses in general and of all the 'ideal' objects of logic and mathematics, (Gg, I, xvii f.)

3. the objective real realm, consisting of material objects, events, processes, etc.

The semantic dimension of Frege's philosophy can also be expressed in terms of a trichotomy, namely

$\alpha$: sign

$\beta$: sense

$\gamma$: reference.

There is a consistent tendency on Frege's part to interrelate these two dimensions, a tendency which - as discussed in passing in § 6 above - has been documented by Thiel in his book (S&R) on Frege's semantics. Thiel claims, as we have seen, that any ontological interpretation of the semantic trichotomy must break down, in view of the fact that not only signs but also senses may play the role of referent; but that Frege himself did not draw Thiel's absolute dividing line between semantics and ontology is seen by his deliberate adoption of the terminology of 'realms' in semantics. (For details see S&R, 150 and § 10 below). Thiel is able to show how Frege's talk of realms involves the covert attempt to identify the middle term $\beta$, of the semantic scheme, with the middle ontological category (the objective non-real) distinguished above. For example Frege tells us, in his paper on the sense-reference theory that

a truth value cannot be part of a thought, any more than, say, the Sun can, for it is not a sense but an object. (Sub, 35).
Such passages can be interpreted, we suggest, as revealing that Frege was in possession of the grain of ontological truth which, from the point of view of the meaning-in-general/object-in-general dichotomy they can be easily shown to express. But Frege's insights in this field are in danger of being lost in the rudimentary ontological scheme of

1. subjective real
2. objective non-real
3. objective real

which is in urgent need of refinement.

The first step will be to recognise the inadequacy of a theory which advances any inherently 'subjective' realm as a proper constituent of any ontology. Commitment to such a realm on Frege's part seems to have been motivated by an inadequate philosophy of mind, based on

a false dichotomy between mental images as subjective and incommunicable, senses as objective and communicable. (FFL, 138; Dummett's criticism of Frege's philosophy of mind occurs in its fullest detail in FFL, pp. 63-69).

Frege makes great play with the notion of mental image or presentation, conceived as an entity in the 'target' position of an act. Against such a background an act of hallucination of, say, a unicorn grazing on the lawn becomes analysed as an act having as its object a private unicorn image. We shall argue however that non-veridical acts of this type are distinguished precisely by the absence of any object. Mental images being clearly excluded also from playing the role of object for veridical acts (acts of perception and of memory and other acts correlated with 'success'-verbs), where it is the transcendent object of the act which 'holds the target position', this suggests the conclusion that mental images belong to the same ontological category as do senses, in that they are entities through which we accede in particular determinate ways to objects of reference or, in the case of hallucinatory images they are that on the basis of which we develop or acquire the illusion of such objects.
Under such a conception, mental images must be recognised as objective formations, at least in the sense of being in principle intersubjectively activatable. Certainly they are not inherently subjective entities in the sense demanded by the '1st realm' of Frege's ontology. It is of course possible to isolate these features of acts which are truly subjective, in the sense of being contingently dependent upon an individual psyche, but this would involve treating each act as belonging to the subject-matter of empirical psychology. It would follow that the act would once more fail to qualify as 'subjective' in the required sense, for it would fall within the scope of an objective science and would become objectively accessible (even if in a distorted form) through the experimental procedures of the given science. It would thus come to be recognised as belonging to the realm of the 'objective real' as Frege conceived it, a consequence of its being totally bound up with objective real objects such as brains, electroencephalographs, sensory nerves, etc. some of which form its ontological support.

Inherently 'subjective' entities, therefore, can be excluded both from the category of 'objects' ('ordinary referents') and from the category of senses or meanings. Thus Frege's 1st realm falls outside the domain of 'ontology' as here advanced.

Frege's 3rd realm, which is determined by a hard-headed conception of the 'objective real world' as this is presented by the various natural sciences (a conception shared by both Frege and Ingarden) can, however, be accepted as it stands. Hence much comes to depend upon the realm of the objective 'non-real' in the Fregean framework.

At first sight it appears that in allowing within the same ontological category not only 'thoughts' and senses in general, but also numbers and truth values conceived as objects, Frege reveals that the ontological promise of his early sense-reference theory has gone unfulfilled. The case is, as we shall see, more subtle than this. For it is possible to
develop & defend a conception of Frege's logical objects as being more properly a species of meaning-entity, and we shall argue, indeed, that this is the only coherently defensible philosophy of logical entities as such. But there is some independent interest in first developing a more orthodox view, according to which Frege's logical entities are to be counted as ideal objects.

On the basis of such a view we can distinguish the following components which make up the hybrid Fregean category of the objective non-real:

A. a component category of meaning-entities, which is just Frege's 'realm of senses' (including the 'realm of thoughts') presented above - hence the temptation to identify 2 with $\mathfrak{P}$ in the semantic trichotomy.

B. a component category of ideal objects that is of objects which are atemporal and existentially autonomous in the sense that they do not depend for their existence on anything beyond themselves (not even upon minds). \( \mathcal{R} \) (Real objects, in this (Ingardenian) terminology, are just these autonomous objects which are temporally determined.)

In the present work, it should be stressed, B is allowed only as a perhaps empty possibility, that is to say, in defending an ontology which is sufficiently refined to allow a place for the given category we do not thereby commit ourselves to the existence of any particular members of that category.

A and B, together with a re-introduced realm (C) of the 'objective real' constitute a new ontological trichotomy. What is noteworthy about this new trichotomy is that we can read off immediately a 'realm of sense' as an ontological category. It becomes possible also to read off a 'realm of reference', which is simply the union of all the categories distinguished. Thus it becomes possible to lay to rest the 'anontological' claims advanced, for
example by Thiel, to the effect that

the application of the sense-reference schema in an ontological

table is in every case defective and thus inadmissible. (Thiel, 1967

p.275).

Our refinement of the Fregean ontology has so far been only a partial
one however. For we find that the dubious realm of autonomous ideal objects
needs to be at least supplemented, and perhaps even replaced completely, by
a complex, stratified array of categories of intentional objects, including
abstract (higher-order intentional) objects generated on the basis of particular
forms of linguistic machinery. Such objects can all be designated as
'intentional', either because they are, like Holmes, dependent for their 'weak'
existence upon acts or networks of acts of consciousness, or because they are,
like the North Sea, dependent for their 'demarcation' upon such acts.

Purported intentional entities are admitted as intentional objects
wherever we have adequate intersubjective access in referential acts,
especially acts which are executed on the basis of linguistic or symbolic
structures such as novels, scores and Admiralty charts. Intentional objects
then have a peculiar 'double structure' in possessing not only properties in
the strict sense (Eigenschaften), but also an 'inner stock' of characteristics
(Merkmale) which they are merely ascribed. Holmes, for example, has the
properties of non-existence, having been introduced as a fictional character by
Doyle in 1891, having been, perhaps, psychoanalysed by Freud in 1897, and so on.
Finally he has the property of having been ascribed the characteristics of living
in Baker Street, of being a detective, of having solved the case of the
disappearing fan, and so on. None of the latter characteristics, it must be
noted, is a property of Holmes, and thus it may be presented as a thesis of
the present work that Sherlock Holmes is not a detective. This is a thesis which
can be independently argued, however, since, as Cocchiarella's work reminds us,
detectivehood is a property which is restricted to **existent objects**; 
(although this cannot rule out the possibility of Holmes' being held to 
be a detective by those gullible readers of Doyle's works who believe that 
they are works of history and not of fiction).

Now whilst all intentional objects have temporal **properties** (for they 
are brought into 'existence'; in a weak sense of this term; only with the 
creation of, say, a literary work), not all such objects have temporally 
determined **characteristics**, for not all have been ascribed the status of 
being in time, of participating in courses of events alongside other temporal 
objects. Many abstract objects (intentionally demarcated objects) such as 
the spatio-temporal continuum of relativity theory at one extreme and the 
"empty set" at the other (the latter is the result of applying a process of 
demarcation to nothing at all, something which we shall see is perfectly 
possible within the theory developed) lack such temporally determined char-
acteristics, the spatio-temporal continuum, in particular, because it is 
presented as being 'outside' time in the mundane (local or 'phenomenological') 
sense to which we here appeal. I wish therefore to suggest a division 
of intentional objects into 

(i) **quasi-real objects**, such as the objects of fiction, 
and  
(ii) **quasi-ideal objects**, the clearest cases of which are what I 
have called 'peripheral' mathematical objects (see my 1975,§§ 1,5 and 7), 
such as large cardinals of Cantorean set theory. Of course commitment to 
(at least) some mathematical objects as merely **quasi-ideal** implies a rejection 
of the 'full' platonist conception of mathematical and logical objects to 
which Frege, for example, seems to have been committed. The next three 
chapters will be devoted to the justification of this rejection of full 
platonism and to providing a more detailed but still preliminary account 
of those 'intentional' entities (including meaning-entities of various types) 
to which 'weak' platonism may justly be committed. First however let us 
present the ontological **story so far**, in the form of a **schema** 
which provides a closer approximation, on this level of generality, to the
ontological theory which we are seeking:

A. the realm of senses (including thoughts and functional and relational concepts, even including 'presentations' to the extent that these are not the creatures of empirical psychology),

B₁. the realm of quasi-ideal objects (including admissible objects of peripheral mathematics and abstract objects such as (pure) sets, directions, shapes, sizes, etc.),

B₂. the realm of autonomous ideal objects (which, we must stress, is put forward only as an empty possibility; this realm contains any platonistically existing mathematical objects which may exist),

C₁. the realm of quasi-real objects (including, for example, fictional characters and temporally-determined 'abstract' objects such as the North Sea (the demarcation of which allows, e.g. for the future growth of Holland by polder),

C₂. the realm of autonomous real objects (Frege's objective real realm).

Despite the inclusion in this schema of the two supplementary realms B₁ and C₁ of intentional objects, objects which Frege would by no means have been willing to countenance as such, the given schema, presented as a complete ontology, would nevertheless be in an important sense faithful to the Fregean spirit. For if each of the object-realms is put forward as containing individual 'objects-proper' only, then the universal element of the given ontology comes to be confined, as with Frege, to the 'conceptual' plane, - even though that plane is identified, in our modified schema, as the realm of thoughts and of senses in general.

Hence we shall be conscious of making a radical departure from Frege's approach when we assert that each of the 'object'-realms B₁,B₂,C₁,C₂ distinguished above is to include, besides individual objects-proper, also
properties (of individual objects), relations (between such objects),
states of affairs (involving such objects) and also - at least in the case
of realm $C_2$ of real spatio-temporal objects - events and processes which
those objects undergo. Each category will be determined, as appropriate, in
such a way as to be applicable to the objects of the realm to which it
belongs - although this does not rule out that there are members of some
categories which apply to more than one object-realm. (This is seen most
clearly, perhaps, by the example of aesthetic and other values - not here
distinguished in any precise sense as to their ontological status - which
can apply, it seems, both to real and to quasi-real individual objects.)

Extended discussion of these categories of 'objects-in-general' will be
postponed for later chapters; here we shall need to make only the following
point: It is possible, for example in the case of real objects $C_2$, to
distinguish appropriate autonomous properties and relations (the properties
of being red and of being vertebrate, say, and the relations of consanguinity
with and of being soluble in). But it is possible also to distinguish certain
more or less abstract entities, for example the properties of objecthood,
of propertyhood, the relations of being joined together in a numberable
totality with, or of being thought about, which belong to the realm of objects
not so much as constituents, but rather as features of the superstructure
of that realm. The reader is asked to bear in mind, through the sections
which follow, that there are superstructural features of a parallel type
which can be distinguished also in the realm of meanings.