

lern⁴⁶ sowie in denen von Roderick Chisholm zur Sachverhalts-Ontologie⁴⁷. Neuerdings erfährt die Sachverhalts-Ontologie auch in der "situation semantics" von Barwise/Perry (1983) sowie in neueren polnischen Arbeiten⁴⁸ zur "formalen Ontologie" von "situations" eine Wiedergeburt.

46. Vgl. z.B. Bergmann (1964) und Grossmann (1983). Damit verwandt ist auch Armstrong (1978).

47. Vgl. z.B. Chisholm (1976).

48. Vgl. dazu vor allem Wolniewicz (1982).

Appendices

I. English Summary

Both 'Sachverhalt' and 'state of affairs' seem to have been derived from the juridical 'status' in the sense of 'status rerum' (state or constitution of things) as contrasted with the 'status hominum' or state of a man (as slave, free, etc.).⁴⁹ The term 'status rerum' is not, however, to be found in the *corpus juris*, but seems to be rooted rather in that branch of rhetorical theory which relates to the conduct of a trial. Here 'status' is defined as 'the question which grows out of a given legal conflict'. Thus for example Quintilian writes: 'What I call status is called by others constitution, by others question, and by others that which one can infer from the question.' 'Status' in this connection signifies also in an extended sense 'the way things stand, the condition or peculiarity of a thing in regard to its circumstances, position, order'.

This usage may bring to mind certain passages in Aristotle, in which the *pragma* is seen as that on which the truth of the *logos* depends, and - as Nuchelmans, above all, has argued - elements of the *Sachverhalt* doctrine are to this extent present already in Aristotle. The disposition of things (*dispositio rerum*) is similarly taken by Aquinas as the cause of the truth of a judgment: '*dispositio rei est causa veritatis in opinione et oratione*', and modern interpreters of Aquinas have accordingly been able to read the concept of *Sachverhalt* into his philosophy also. Similar views are present also in the later middle ages, for example in the doctrine of the *complexe significabile* - of that which can be signified only as a complex

49. Further support for the derivation of 'Sachverhalt' from the Latin 'status rerum' is provided by the parallel development of the English term 'state of affairs' from the same source. Thus the O.E.D. speaks of 'state of things' or 'state of affairs' as 'the way in which events or circumstances stand disposed (at a particular time or within a particular sphere).' The English translation of the German (or more precisely the Husserlian) 'state of affairs' can be documented already in Pitkin (1905), and it may have been against this Husserlian background that the term was introduced into the Ogden-Ramsey translation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Cf. in this light the appendices to Ogden/Richards (1923).

- defended by Wodeham, Crathorn and Gregory of Rimini.

More influential, however, is the treatment of 'status' in Goclenius, who draws a clear opposition between 'status' and 'propositio' from the point of view of the science of law: "status and propositio are not identical," he writes, for "just as there are two persons who stand trial before a judge [...], so in this science there are two sorts of propositions (explanations, statements of the case): on the one hand the accusation, on the other the defence. Status is to be distinguished from both, in so far as this is a statement neither of accusation nor of defence, but, so to speak, the fulcrum about which turn both the representations of the prosecution and those of the defence." Goclenius goes on to provide a series of metaphorical redescriptions of this idea: 'status' is described as 'goal of the deliberations', 'starting point and core of the litigation', 'that about which one disputes', and so on, which suggests that even as late as the 17th century the term 'status' was still not completely fixed in its meaning.

As Mulligan (1985) has pointed out, the term 'Sachverhalt' itself almost certainly makes its first technical appearance in the German philosophical literature in the *Pure Logic* of Julius Bergmann, published in 1879. Bergmann was a so-called 'objective idealist', close to Hermann Lotze. The *Sachverhalt*, according to Bergmann, is that which has the role of the objective element, the *res*, with which the *intellectus* has to stand in *adaequatio*. Knowledge, for Bergmann, is accordingly that thinking 'whose thought content is in harmony with the *Sachverhalt*, and is therefore true'.⁵⁰

The role of Lotze is important here, since not only was he associated with Bergmann in Göttingen, but his lectures were attended also by Stumpf, Frege, and Marty, all of whom have a role to play in the story

50. Bergmann's usage finds a partial echo in the 2nd edition of Lotze's own *Logic* of 1880, where Lotze introduces his treatment of judgment with the following passage: "Every judgment seeks a relation between the contents of two presentations, but not a relation of the two presentations themselves. From this material relation [*sachliches Verhältnis*] of the presented contents there does of course follow a certain relation of the presentations through which we think it. [...] Only because one already presupposes this material relation as obtaining [...] can one picture it in a sentence [*in einem Satze abbilden*]".

that follows. It was in fact Stumpf's employment of the term '*Sachverhalt*' in his logic lectures of summer 1888 (almost certainly independent of that of Bergmann) which would prove to be of most lasting influence. Here, as Stumpf himself later recorded, the term '*Sachverhalt*' was introduced to stand for that 'specific content of a judgment' "which [1] is to be distinguished from the content of a presentation (the matter) and [2] is expressed linguistically in "that-clauses" or in substantivised infinitives. A copy of Stumpf's lithographed notes to these lectures has survived in the Husserl Archive in Louvain, where we read: "From the matter of the judgment we distinguish its content, the *Sachverhalt* that is expressed in the judgment. For example 'God is' has for its matter God, for its content the existence of God. 'There is no God' has the same matter but its content is: non-existence of God."⁵¹

The *Sachverhalt* or judgment-content is, Stumpf tells us, a 'necessary correlate' of the intellectual function of judging. Together with concepts, aggregates or collectives, Gestalt-qualities and values, the *Sachverhalt* is assigned by Stumpf to the category of what he calls 'formations' (*Gebilde*). These are to be distinguished first of all from 'functions', i.e. from our mental acts. But they are to be distinguished also from the 'appearances' to which they relate, i.e. from sense data (or 'physical phenomena' in the Brentanian terminology). The latter, as Stumpf conceives them, are given to us as independent of the mind; *qua* organised or collected, however - for example as they occur in the context of a melody - they are taken up into consciousness in such a way that they are given to us as existing only as immanent to the relevant acts. A Stumpfian state of affairs, similarly, can exist only as 'immanent content' of an actually occurring judgment.

The *Sachverhalt*, accordingly, cannot 'be given directly and thus be real of itself alone, independently of any function.' *Sachverhalte*, like other Stumpfian formations, 'are factual only as contents of functions.' They "are not to be found anywhere separated off [...] in some 'supersensible realm' as entities existing in and of themselves. They do not exist as dead preparations or petrefactions, but only in the context of the living being

51. Husserl, who had also attended the logic lectures given by Stumpf in the preceding year, adds a marginal note to this passage to the effect that the distinction in question is "not contained in the dictations of 1887".

of the mind." For Stumpf, therefore, the *Sachverhalt* is immanent to a judging act, where for Bergmann it had been something transcendent, on the side of the object. A third type of position, also drawing on certain ideas in the work of Lotze and anticipated in the *Theory of Science* of Bernard Bolzano, sees the judgment-content as something ideal, an abstract 'thought' or 'proposition in itself', a meaning-entity which can be the common property of many thinkers. A view of this sort was of course defended also by Frege.

Stumpf's views correspond to the earlier position of his teacher Brentano, who seems to have held an immanentist view in relation to all contents of mental acts, i.e. in relation to objects of thought in general. Both the thinker and that of which he thinks have being, Brentano holds, but that which is thought of has being in a merely secondary sense. Where the act of thought is something real (a real event or process), the object of thought has being only to the extent that the act which thinks it has being. The object of thought is according to its nature something non-real which dwells in [*innewohnt*] a real substance (a thinker).⁵²

On the other hand, however, Brentano accepted at this stage also a version of the correspondence theory of truth along Aristotelian lines, though he has very little to say about the ontology of truth as such. To the question whether there are special entities - judgment-contents or states of affairs - to which our judgments would correspond, Brentano responds even at this stage by pointing out that talk of such entities would be of little use, since to elucidate the notion of *the truth of the judgment* through the notion of *the existence of the object* is to explain what is understood by appeal to something that is no better understood, and 'nothing would be accomplished thereby'.⁵³ Here we see perhaps one germ of Brentano's later view according to which truth has to be elucidated epistemically.⁵⁴

The idea of a *Sachverhalt*-based correspondence theory was pursued further by Brentano's pupil Anton Marty, for whom the judgment-content [*Urteilsinhalt*] "is that which grounds objectively the correctness of our judging or, more precisely: it is that without which such activity could

not be correct or adequate." The judgment-content must therefore be something whose existence is independent of consciousness, and moreover there can be judgment-contents corresponding only to judgments which are true.

Meinong, too, in his *On Assumptions*, defends a similar opposition between two sorts of entity - objects and objectives - though the category of Meinongian objectives is wider than that of Martian judgment-contents in admitting objectives which do not obtain.⁵⁵ Meinong distinguishes not only between positive and negative objectives of being (*that A is, that A is not*) but also between positive and negative objectives of so-being (*that A is B, that A is not B*), as also between objectives constituted by objects and 'objectives of higher order' constituted by further objectives of lower order. Truth, possibility and also probability are, according to Meinong, attributes not of objects but of objectives.

Neither Marty nor Meinong was absolutely clear as to the opposition between *propositions* in the logical sense (as bearers of truth and falsehood) and *Sachverhalte* as forming an ontological category of that in virtue of which a sentence or proposition is true. Complete clarity in this respect, as also in regard to the relations between immanent judgment-contents, transcendent states of affairs and ideal meanings was attained only by Husserl, who explicitly defended an ontological conception of *Sachverhalte* as objectual truth-makers.⁵⁶ Husserl argued further

(a) that *Sachverhalte* constitute a universal category of judgment-correlates, parallel to the category of objects as correlates of names or nominal acts;

(b) that *Sachverhalte* can serve not only as correlates of acts of judgment but also - through nominalisation - as correlates of special kinds of nominal acts (for example when we say *that S is p* 'is welcome', 'is probable', 'has as consequence that...', etc.);

(c) that *Sachverhalte* can serve as correlates also of certain non-judgmental acts of wishing, questioning, doubting, etc.;

55. Meinong indeed rejects the term '*Sachverhalt*' since he finds it inappropriate where non-factual objectives are concerned.

56. Russell (1921), p. 14f., similarly, distinguishes in addition to the immanent content of a belief (which is for him a certain wholly determinate mental event), the 'objective' or 'actual fact that makes the belief true'.

52. Cf. Brentano (1930), pp. 31f., Engl., p. 27.

53. See § 57 of Brentano's 1889 essay on the concept of truth, published as ch. 1 of Brentano (1930).

54. See parts III and IV of Brentano (1930).

(d) that acts of wishing and willing relate always to *Sachverhalte*, never to things.

Husserl's work in ontology was continued by his disciples in Munich, above all Johannes Daubert and Adolf Reinach. Daubert pursued what might be called a naturalised version of Husserl's theory, attempting to understand the *Sachverhalt* as a special kind of real complex, doubly dependent on both the objects which are its *Glieder* or 'elements' and the 'judging intentions' by which it is picked out from or set in relief against the background of surrounding reality.⁵⁷ Reinach, on the other hand, defended a Platonistic *Sachverhalt*-ontology inspired in part by Meinong. He conceives *Sachverhalte* as (1) that which is believed and asserted in a judgment, (2) that which stands in a relation of ground and consequent, (3) that which may suffer modalities, and (4) that which stands in a relation of contradictory positivity and negativity, and the totality of *Sachverhalte* he conceives as an eternal realm comprehending the correlates of all possible judgments, whether positive or negative, true or false, necessary or contingent, atomic or complex.

It is not our job here to sketch the evolution of the *Sachverhalt*-concept since Reinach's "On the Theory of the Negative Judgment" of 1911. Certainly interest in the ontology of *Sachverhalte* has declined since the publication of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* of 1921, though the notion has been kept alive by individuals such as Chisholm, Gustav Bergmann, and their followers.

II. Open Problems

1. How, precisely, does the *status rerum* tradition relate to the *complexe significabile* tradition, and what, if any, is the role played by either of these in the coinage of the term *Sachverhalt*? Was there any continuity at all between the late middle ages and the renaissance of *Sachverhalt*-ontologies in the 19th century?

57. Perhaps the most important contribution of the Munich *Sachverhalt*-ontologists was their exploitation of the *Sachverhalt*-category as basis for a remarkably sophisticated theory of speech acts, anticipating many of the ideas discovered only some decades later by Austin and his colleagues in Oxford. See Smith (1987a).

2. When were '*Sachverhalt*' and 'state of affairs' first used as technical terms (1) in philosophy, (2) in legal contexts?

3. Have states of affairs even been considered or taken seriously independently of theories of truth, of will and desire (and of the related activities of courts of law)?

4. What distinguishes *Sachverhalte* (states of affairs) from *Zustände* (states, *Beschaffenheiten*)? What, more generally, are the characteristic marks of the *Sachverhalt*-concept?

5. How, if at all, is Wittgenstein's use of the terminology of *Sachverhalt* related to that of his predecessors?

6. What precisely is the relation between *Sachverhalt*-ontologies and the work on facts of Bradley, Peirce, Russell, Baylis, Clark, etc., set out in Olson (1987)?

III. The Wider Context⁵⁸

The coinage of '*Sachverhalt*' marks a step forward in the ontology of judgment because it led philosophers to look for something on the side of the things [*die 'Sachen'*] themselves, some 'fact' or 'objective', to serve as that in virtue of which a judgment is true. It is part of a wider development in philosophical logic and ontology at the turn of the century, a development which led on the one hand to Husserlian formal ontology, and on the other hand to the modern truth-functional conception of logic. I shall here attempt to pick out the most important aspects of this development, concentrating particularly on the contributions of the philosophers mentioned above.

1. Brentano, in 1874, effected what is since Descartes, Malebranche and Spinoza the first clear psychological differentiation of *judgment* and *presentation* or *Vorstellung*. Certainly Bolzano and others had earlier done much of what was necessary to effect a clear *logical* distinction between the two (or rather between what Bolzano referred to as 'propositions in themselves' and 'presentations in themselves'). Bolzano's account of the underlying psychology is however far from clear⁵⁹, and in this he is no

58. The developments here sketched are described in more detail in Smith (1989).

59. Thus in § 19 of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, he identifies without further ado

more than conforming to the standards of the most influential of his psychologist and non-psychologist predecessors.⁶⁰ The logical distinction between judgment and complex concept had been familiar, certainly, to medieval philosophers. Contemporaries of Brentano such as Schröder and Peano pointed out the difference in their work, but hung on to the parallels in their symbolisms. Frege's (1879) *Begriffsschrift* (§ 2), too, still retains elements of the traditional conception of judgment as a matter of the 'combination of ideas', though this is outweighed by a sophisticated theory of that moment of assertion or affirmation which is characteristic of the judgment as Frege conceives it. Note that Frege's moment of assertion, in contrast to the 'affirmation and denial' of the Brentanian theory, is always positive, and the view that negation belongs properly to what Frege called the judgeable content, rather than to the quality of the act of judging itself, a view accepted also by Husserl and Reinach, has since established itself quite generally among logicians.⁶¹

2. Stumpf, as we have seen, called attention in 1888 to the need to recognise, in addition to the content of a presentation, also a special *judgment-content*, to which he gave the name '*Sachverhalt*'. Hence the latter is, for Stumpf, a special kind of immanent content and not, as it later became, a special kind of transcendent object (though neither he nor his mentor Brentano would at this stage have recognised a distinction here).

3. It was especially Twardowski in his *On the Content and Object of Presentations* of 1894, who pointed out the need to distinguish the object of an act from its (immanent) content. However, while the act of judgment is held by Twardowski at this stage to have special *content* of its own, it is still seen as inheriting its *object* from the relevant underlying presentation.

4. Three years later, Twardowski went further and pointed to the need to recognise a special unitary judgment-*object*; he thereby effected a general-

what he calls an 'asserted proposition' with the 'thought of a proposition', and in the same section he comes close to identifying judging with a 'presenting accompanied by a holding as true'. (Almost all logicians of the 19th century were, incidentally, prepared to identify *judging* with *holding true*.)

60. See e.g. Hume (1739), Bk. I, Pt. III, Sec. 7; Kant (1787), B 93.

61. Cf. Husserl (1900/01), V, § 20; Reinach (1911), § 14 of transl.

isation of the content-object distinction to the sphere of judging acts. Note, in this respect, that the recognition of a psychological and a logical distinction between presenting and judging was to a large extent independent of the marking of a corresponding distinction on the side of the object. Not everyone took this separate, ontological step, and some (e.g. Frege and Russell) took it half-heartedly. With the appearance of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* at the turn of the century, however, the acceptance of the *Sachverhalt* as objectual judgment-correlate found wide acceptance not only among philosophers in Germany but also among psychologists and mathematicians such as Oswald Külpe, Otto Selz and Hermann Weyl.

5. Another distinction (anticipated in some degree by Bolzano) is that between the immanent and ideal content of a mental act. The ideal content of an act of presentation might be called a concept; the ideal content of an act of judgment might be called a proposition. Bolzano used the terms 'presentation in itself' and 'proposition in itself'; Frege spoke of '*Sinn*' and '*Gedanke*'. The significance of this opposition and the importance of the parallelism between the two sorts of content were, however, not clearly recognised before Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. This is because Bolzano, like Frege and his successors in the analytic tradition, in tending to leave aside questions of psychology, thereby left themselves in a position where they were unable to do justice to the relations between ideal contents and our thinking acts themselves. The applicability of logic to empirical thinkings and inferences is thus rendered all but inexplicable - an outcome which further reinforced the initial aversion to psychology. Brentano, on the other hand, and more orthodox Brentanians such as Marty and Oskar Kraus, tended to the opposite error: because they feared the 'Platonism' of ideal contents, their treatment of logic was less than successful and therefore so also was their treatment of the specifically logical properties of our mental acts.

The significance of the move to a concept of proposition as ideal or abstract entity, whether in Husserl's, in Bolzano's, or in Frege's sense, will be clear. Above all, it made possible a conception of propositions as entities capable of being *manipulated* in different ways in formal theories - a conception which yielded some of the most important fruits of the anti-psychologistic movement in logic at the turn of the century. In just the way that Cantor had shown mathematicians of an earlier generation how to manipulate sets or classes conceived in abstraction from their members

and from the manner of their generation, so logicians were able to become accustomed, by degrees, to manipulating propositional objects in abstraction from their psychological roots in acts of judgment.

6. Another dimension to which the orthodox Brentanians did less than justice might be called the dimension of *logical syntax*. Here the crucial move consisted in the recognition that acts of judgment are distinguished from acts of presentation not only by the presence of a moment of assertion or belief, but also - on the level of grammar - by a special ('sentential' or 'propositional') *form*, just as the *Sachverhalt* is distinguished in its ontological form not only from objects in the narrow sense but also from properties, relations, and so on. That which gets affirmed or asserted in a judgment must have a certain inner complexity, must, as one says, be 'propositionally articulated'. This is marked by the fact that the linguistic expression of a judgment must contain a verb, with all that this implies in the way of tense and aspect modifications. It must be capable also of modification by logical operators such as negation, conjunction, etc., as well as by modal operators such as 'it is possible that', 'it is necessary that', and so on.

Certainly Frege is responsible for some of the most important advances in our understanding of logico-grammatical form. It is ironical, however, that in his conception of sentences as special sorts of names, he is, as far as the logico-grammatical treatment of the peculiarities of judgment is concerned, no further advanced than was Brentano. Here, again, one has to look to Bolzano in order to find truly coherent anticipations of the idea of propositional form in the modern period.⁶² But the idea of a logical grammar, of a formal theory of the *categories* of linguistic unit and of the categorical laws governing the combination of such units, was first put forward by Husserl in his IVth Logical Investigation. This work influenced in turn the development of the theory of grammatical categories by Leśniewski and his successors in Poland.⁶³

Husserl, be it noted, pursues his logical grammar not by reading off empirically existing categories from known languages (whether natural or artificial), but by building up his theory on the basis of more abstract considerations relating, for example, to the oppositions between simple

62. Cf. Bolzano (1837), § 127.

63. See above all Ajdukiewicz's essay "Die syntaktische Konnexität" of 1935.

and complex, categorematic and syncategorematic, defective and non-defective uses of language. His treatment of the more specific opposition between name and sentence is to be found elsewhere, in the fourth chapter of his Vth Logical Investigation, where he deals with the different modes of intentionality associated with different forms of language use.

7. A further distinction is that between an episodic *act* of judgment and an enduring *state* of conviction or belief. Brentano did not see the need to draw this distinction, and the same holds for his more immediate disciples, including Twardowski, as also for the British empiricist psychologists who inspired him. Thus Brentano's term 'judgment' comprehends indiscriminately both episodic assertions and enduring attitudes of belief or disbelief, and 'presentation', too, is subject to a similar ambiguity. (Where, therefore, we have talked above of Brentano's or Twardowski's theory of 'acts', we ought more properly to have retained a more neutral terminology of 'phenomenon' or mental 'process' or 'activity'.) It is this ambiguity which allows Brentano to regard the two sorts of phenomena as united together in perception, which he defines as a judgment founded on an intuitive presentation as its basis. A perception, on this view, is the intuitive having of an object, combined with an attitude of belief or acceptance of this object as existing.⁶⁴ It is however difficult to see how the necessary unity of judgment and intuitive presentation can come about, in view of the quite different temporal structures which seem to be characteristic of each. Judgment, as we normally suppose, is an episodic act, where intuitive presentation is a process stretching through time.⁶⁵

As will be clear, all the above developments are of more than merely historical significance: each represents a hard-won conceptual clarification with a systematic importance in its own right, though it may be that, with the passage of time, some philosophers have succumbed to the temptation to ignore them.

64. See e.g. Brentano (1925), p. 48, Engl. Ed., p. 209.

65. True clarity in this respect seems to have been first achieved by Reinach (1911). Interestingly, Reinach argues that, where the Frege-Husserl theory of assertion as a single positive moment of 'force' or 'quality' common to all judgments is correct for episodic judging acts, when we move over to deal with enduring states of conviction, then the Brentanian theory of affirmation and denial is more appropriate.

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