has slowly tended to return Australian philosophy to the pluralism of the early days. And diversification is likely to continue for other reasons, not least the growing awareness of Australia’s proximity to Asian-Pacific cultures; a declining Anglo-Celtic population with the cultural distance from Britain-Europe; and the sustained intervention of native Aboriginal primordial cultural articulations and arts. The essays range from scholarly studies to new developments of phenomenological themes, as well as critiques of phenomenological research. At least three essays offer criticisms of Heidegger — O’Dwyer on the traditional problems of realism, invoking Husserl and Ryle, and Bilimoria on the open-ended ambiguities of Heidegger toward Asian thought despite his anxiety about the “Europeanization of the Earth,” with Marion Tapper being more critical of Richard Rorty than of Heidegger in reducing philosophy to literary history and epistemology to ontological presuppositions.

Tapper is a good example of a second generation “full-fledged” phenomenologist, supervised by Doniela for her thesis on Heidegger, and in 1983 appointed to Melbourne to replace Brenda Judge, who had taught the courses introduced by Charlesworth. Tapper worked closely with Lycos (until the latter’s untimely death in 1995). Russell Grigg, a former student of Charlesworth’s who completed his master’s thesis on Ricœur and on to study in Lacan’s school in Paris, combines interests in phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and psychoanalysis. Other younger scholars include Kevin Hart (tending toward deconstruction and atheology), Elizbeth Grosz (working on French feminist theorists and Nietzsche), and Karen Green (who has also worked on femininity and transgressed). Peter Parker (formerly of Rhodes University) with Renuka Sharma work on the interface with psychology, psychoanalysis, and phenomenology, inspired by Carlo Giori. That the project of infusing phenomenology into Australia is by no means complete can be illustrated by way of the most recent successful submission of a masterly doctoral thesis on Husserl’s idea of temporalization, by Damien Byers, a young and promising Husserl scholar who researched in the Belgium archives and now teaches at Sydney.

FOR FURTHER STUDY


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Austrian philosophy, published his four-volume *Wissenschaftslehre* in 1837. The logical Platonism that is propagated in this work is present in various forms in the work of Bolzano's successors, and it can still be detected in the Prolegomena to Edmund Husserl's *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900–1901). Franz Brentano, too, though born in Germany, falls squarely within the Austrian tradition as far as his philosophy is concerned, and Brentano's most important students—above all Christian von Ehrenfels (1859–1932), Anton Marty (1847–1914), Alexius Meinong (1853–1920), Carl Stumpf (1848–1936), Kasimir Twardowski (1866–1938), and Tomáćés Garrigue Masaryk (1850–1937)—helped to spread the influence of his ideas and methods throughout the Habsburg Empire. Not the least important of these students was Edmund Husserl himself, who was born in Habsburg Moravia in 1859. Husserl helped to spread Brentano's ideas and methods into Germany proper. The move to "transcendental idealism" in Husserl's later writings implies, however, that his philosophy must be seen as straddling the boundary between the two traditions.

Many 19th century philosophers, including Franz Brentano, accepted a doctrine of immanentism, according to which *meaning, truth, value*, and sometimes even the world as a whole are seen as being immanent to (as real constituent parts or "contents") of the mind or "spirit" (Geist). It was in no small part a result of the efforts of Brentano's Austrian disciples, including Husserl, that this immanentist mode of philosophizing was undermined—and phenomenology itself, as well as the clarification of the concept of intentionality that it brings in its wake, may be seen as a byproduct of this effort to turn away from "subjectivity" and go back to the matters themselves.

Brentano's doctrine of intentionality, presented in his *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* (1874) and elsewhere, is still resolutely immanentistic. The objects of our mental acts are seen as immanent as "intentionally existent in" these acts themselves. The tricky issue, which was addressed systematically by Brentano's students, is one of explaining how mental acts are able, on occasions, to achieve a directedness to transcendent objects in the world. The problem turns on the fact that acts—for example, of perception or of hallucination—that seem from the side of consciousness to be exactly alike, may differ radically with regard to their relation to an object. Yet acts that lack (existing) objects may yet be described using the very same terms that we use for acts that hit their targets—as when we say that *Hans was thinking about unicorns* or *Mary was dreaming about Atlantis*. The account of these matters worked out by Brentano's students lends heavily on his theory of "modified" uses of language. We distinguish, first of all, two sorts of adjectives: the *attributive* and the *modifying* adjectives. The former complete or enlarge the meaning of the expressions to which they are attached (as in "good man," "red horse," "genuine rubies"). The latter completely change these original meanings (as for example in: "dead man," "cancelled performance," "declined handshake," "frustrated entry," and so on).

For the early Husserl, our talk of the objects of non-derivational acts is modified talk, and the correspondingly "modified acts" are distinguished not by the fact that there are special objects to which they are directed, but by the fact that they lack objects entirely: a fictional object is not a special kind of object, any more than an averted war is a special kind of war. Thus the structure of modified acts is not in any sense relational. It is rather to be understood in terms of special internal qualities that the given acts possess. Certainly we find it convenient to avail ourselves of Realistic "fictional" or "intentional" objects in order to describe such qualities, but this fact has no ontological significance. The view in question was worked out by Husserl in papers on Twardowski that date from 1894. Husserl insists quite comonomensially that to say that the god Jupiter is an intentional object of my act is not to say that there is something, namely Jupiter, that lacks existence but is thought about by me. It is simply to say that my act is structured qualitatively in a certain way, so that it is describable as a presentation-of-the-god-Jupiter.

Among Brentano's students, Christian von Ehrenfels, was born in the vicinity of Vienna in 1859 and served as professor of philosophy in Prague for more than thirty years. Von Ehrenfels was above all responsible for initiating the revolution in psychological research that is associated with the concept of gestalt, a revolution to which contributions were made also by von Ehrenfels' teacher Meinong, by the members of Meinong's school in Graz; by Karl Bühler (1879–1963) and Hugo Bergmann (1883–1975)—the latter a close friend of Franz Kafka, the brother having together attended philosophy lectures of Von Ehrenfels and Marty as part of their studies at Prague; Bergmann also initiated Kafka into the mysteries of the "Louvre Circle," a discussion group devoted to the study of Brentano's thinking.

Von Ehrenfels' doctrine of "gestalt qualities," first put forward in 1891, was a response to a problem that had arisen within the atomicist framework that had hitherto dominated the science of psychology. How, if perception is built up out of "atoms" or "elements" of sensation, are we to understand the perception of a complex formation such as a melody? How, above all, are we to explain the fact that we can recognize the "same" melody even though it has been transposed into a different key? Von Ehrenfels' answer to this question amounted to a radical overhaul of the atomicist approach in psychology. It involved the postulation of sui generis qualities of complex wholes, qualities that are given immediately in experience and that are invariant even through transformations of the associated sensory elements that serve as their bases.

Husserl developed ideas similar to those of Von Ehrenfels in *Philosophie der Arithmetik* (1891). In chapter 11 of this work, he points to certain "figu-
ing capacity to bring about relevant transient meaning-act. This, as Twardowski points out, explains our tendency to assert that the meaning is somehow “in-cluded” or “embodied” in the sign, and to speak of a “fixing” in the sign of a nondurable mental product in a way that is analogous to the fixing of a sound by means of a phonograph record. It explains also our common sense assumption that our thoughts grow in complexity in tandem with our acquisition of successively more sophisticated rules of language.

Systematic complexity in the world of signs may contribute to — is indeed for Twardowski quite literally a cause of — a parallel systematic complexity in the “subjective” realm of meaning. Communication and mutual understanding is possible, on this account, not because our words and sentences relate to Platonic meaning entities capable of being entertained simultaneously by different subjects, but because our words are able to evoke in others mental processes that are in relevant respects similar to those mental processes that those words were used to express. These ideas exerted an influence not least on the theory of language and meaning put forward by Ingarden in *Das literarische Kunstwerk* (The literary work of art, 1931).

Twardowski also influenced Meinong, whose “theory of objects” amounts to an ontology of act-correlates that is strongly phenomenological in spirit, and the same holds true of the work of Ernst Mal³ly (1879—1944), Stefan Witasek (1870—1915), Vittorio Benussi (1878—1927), and Franc Veber (1890—1975), along with other members of Meinong’s school in Graz. Benussi and the influential Cesare Musatti (1897—1989) founded in Italy a tradition of phenomenological psy-

chology that has been kept alive in our own day above all by Gaetano Kanizsa and Paolo Bozzi in the former Habsburg Imperial harbor city of Trieste.

All of the thinkers mentioned above were inspired, directly or indirectly, by Brentano’s project of an ontology of mind that would provide an exhaustive account of the different mental constituents and of the ways in which these constituents are built up to yield larger complex wholes. Brentano’s ideas in this connection can be seen as a continuation of the tradition that results *inter alia* in Husserl’s development of the formal ontology of parts and wholes in the *Logische Untersuchungen*; in the theory of objects of Meinong; in the Graz, Berlin, and Trieste schools of Gestalt psych-ology; and in the development of mereology and logical grammar in Poland.

The idea of a logical grammar, of a formal theory of the categorization of linguistic units and of the categorical laws governing the combination of such units, was first put forward by Husserl in his fourth Investigation. This work influenced in turn the development of the theory of semantic (later “syntactic”) categories by the great Polish logician Stanis³aw Lesniewski (1886—1939), contributions to which were also made by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (1890—1963), who studied with Husserl at Göttingen in the 1920s. Lesniewski, too, inherited through Twardowski an interest in Brentanian and his school, and as a young man he had conceived the project of translating Mart÷s Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprach-philosophie (Investigations on general grammar and philosophy of language, 1908) into Polish. As he himself expressed it, Lesniewski grew up “tuned” to “general grammar” and logico-semantic problems à la Edmund Husserl and the representatives of the so-called Austrian school.

Parallel to the tradition of Brentano and his disciples is that of the Empiricist School of Austrian philosophy established by Ernst Mach (1838—1916), the fruits of whose efforts in Vienna and Prague can be seen not least in the growth of the *logical positivism* movement in Central Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. The project of phenomenology — the project of providing a painstakingly adequate description of what is given in experience precisely as it is given — can itself be interpreted as a more comprehensive and more radical version of positivism in the traditional sense. Indeed, Hermann Lübbe finds no difficulty in asserting that “Ernst Mach and other critical empiricists, regardless of their ‘positivism,’ belong in the tradition of phenomenology.”

The superficial view of the relations between phenomenology and the Vienna positivists has long centered around the attack of Rudolf Carnap (1891—1970) in the second volume of *Erkenntnis* on the “metaphysical nonsense” of Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit* (1927). Thus it has been readily assumed that phenomenology as a whole appeared to Carnap (who had studied with Husserl in Göttingen in 1924—25) and to other members of the Vienna Circle as just another example of the bad old metaphysics that they were aiming to destroy.

The two camps were certainly at odds with each other in central points of doctrine. It was Ingarden who represented one of the first formulations of the now familiar criticalism of the Vienna circle verifiability criterion of meaning — that the criterion is itself meaningless by its own lights — at the Prague World Congress of Philosophy in 1934. Yet Felix Kaufmann was able to retain friendly relations with both camps, and there are a number of respects in which the members of the Vienna Circle were influenced by Husserl’s phenomenology, even if only in the sense that, as we shall see, phenomenology provided a stock of problems that the positivists felt called upon to resolve.

The two (Brentanian and logical positivist) strands of Austrian philosophy were indeed at one stage so closely intertwined that Husserl could be considered as a potential successor to Mach in the chair in Vienna, and Guido Künig has defended the view that there are quite specific parallels between Husserlian phenomenology and the project of “explication” that is defended by Carnap in *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* (The logical structure of the world, 1928). A view of this sort was advanced already in 1932 by Ernst Polak, a student of Moritz Schlick (1882—1936) and man-about-town in Vienna — Polak was *inter alia* the husband of Kafka’s Milena — in a dissertation entitled *Kritik der Phänomenologie durch die Logik* (Critique of phenomenology by means of logic, 1932). The science of phenomenology, according to Polak, “is logic (gram-mar in the most general sense), clarification of what we mean when we speak; its results are tautologies; its findings not statements, but explications.”

Polak’s work is clearly inspired by another Austrian philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and more particularly by the latter’s *Tractatus* (1921). As is seen from Wittgenstein’s own employment of the term “pheno-

menology,” particularly around 1929, it is primarily in regard to the problem of the synthetic a priori — of an “intermediary between logic and physics” — that Husserl’s thinking is crucial to the development of that of Wittgenstein. Husserl’s account of the synthetic a priori is indeed no less important to the work of Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle than is that of Kant, for where Kant sees the realm of the synthetic a priori as residing in the relatively restricted and cognitively inaccessible sphere of transcendental consciousness, Husserl claims that there is a directly accessible
a priori dimension across the entire range of everyday experience — so that the family of propositions that are both synthetic and a priori turns out to be vastly greater on Husserl’s view than on that of Kant. It includes not least such homely examples as “nothing can be both red and green all over” — an example to which Wittgenstein and the Vienna positivists devoted a great deal of their attention.

From the standpoint of the positivists, of course, synthetic a priori propositions do not and cannot exist: all true propositions are either tautologies of logic or contingent truths relating to empirical matters of fact. For Husserl, in contrast, as for the realistic phenomenologists in Munich, there are entire disciplines of synthetic a priori truths, including the discipline of phenomenology itself, as well as a range of “regional ontologies” pertaining to mind, culture, animate nature, and the spatiotemporal world of physical things.

As far as contemporary Austrian philosophers are concerned, phenomenology has been sorely neglected, though important work in the tradition of Bolzano, Brentano, and Meinong has been carried out, *inter alia*, by Johannes Brandl, Reinhard Fabian, Rudolf Haller, Johannes Marek, Edgar Morscher, and Peter Simons. The work on Austrian philosophy of Roderick Chisholm must also be mentioned in this connection, as must work in the Austrian tradition in the newly freed countries of Eastern Europe on the part of thinkers such as WLODZIMIERZ GALEWICZ, TOMASZ LUBOWIECZKI, JAN PAVLIK, ANDRZEJ POŁTAWSKI, ARTUR ROJSCZACH, JAN WOLENSKI, and WOJCIECH ZELANIEC.

FOR FURTHER STUDY


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