On Substances, Accidents and Universals: In Defence of a Constituent Ontology

    Barry Smith




          Preprinted from: Philosophical Papers, 26 (1997), 105–127
          PdF Version

          Introduction

          This essay is an exploration of the ontological landscape of reality. Its aim is to construct an ontological theory which will do justice to reality, and more precisely to those portions or levels of reality which are captured in our ordinary, common-sense or 'folk' conceptual scheme. We shall accordingly take as our starting point such examples of individual substances or continuants as human beings, oxen, logs of wood, icebergs, planets. In addition to substances the theory will have a place also for individual accidents ­ smiles, suntans, pains, beliefs ­ which inhere in substances, and also for essential parts of both substances and accidents, such as the humanity which is an essential part of you, and the coloredness and extendedness which are essential parts of the redness of Rudolf's nose. Our theory of this ordinary reality will, accordingly, be broadly Aristotelian in spirit.