Brigitte Nerlich & David D. Clarke
Language, Action and Context. The Early History of Pragmatics in
Europe and America, 1780-1930.
Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company (Studies in
the Theory and History of Linguistic Science, Volume 80), xii + 497pp.
The history of pragmatics, according to a recently published book,1
"is the distinctively American philosophy". Now this opinion can be defended
if one extends the adjective 'American' to 'American and British'. To most
learners of linguistics pragmatics indeed seems to have its origin in the
works of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), William James (1842-1910),
John Dewey (1859-1952), John Langshaw Austin (1911-1961) or John R. Searle.
And one may even list other American and British thinkers having contributed
to the development of pragmatic thought. Now, the main problem in pragmatics
is its conceptualization: what do we mean when we speak of pragmatics?
Is pragmatics the only notion one has to deal with when one studies its
development in scientific history? It seems plausible to assume that pragmatics
cannot be the only concept. If one takes for instance Searle's 'theory
of speech acts' his theory seems to be just a small part of pragmatics.
On the other hand, Peirce's concept of 'pragmatics' was used by other thinkers,
like James, which caused Peirce to coin the term 'pragmaticism' to distinguish
it from James's way of doing pragmatics.2 So,
what we mean by pragmatic research should be made clear before one could
write its history.
But a second point to consider is the geographical restriction of pragmatic
thought. Is it true that American philosophy is 'distinctively pragmatic'
or can pragmatic thought also be found for instance in German, French or
Dutch linguistic work?
A third aspect, finally, is the domain-specific character of pragmatics:
Is it only linguistics which is concerned with pragmatics or are there
other disciplines where elements of pragmatic thought can be found, for
instance in anthropology?3 So
lots of historiographical, conceptual and geographical problems must be
solved before one can even think of writing a 'history of pragmatics'.
My starting-question is: did Nerlich and Clarke (NC) succeed in solving
them?
The authors seem to have found a rather simple but efficient solution
to the aforementioned problems in their book Language, Action, and Context.
They restrict themselves to a terminology which seems to mirror the
basic notions in pragmatic research. They create a pragmatic ontology in
which individual thinkers and their pragmatic/ pragmaticist approaches
in Europe and America have their own place.4
And in this universe of basic notions comparisons between individual thinkers
are made so as to find out what pragmatics is really about. In their introduction
NC go into several methodological problems concerning the definition of
pragmatics, the need of a history of pragmatics,5
and the relation between pragmatics and speech act theory. The fact
that pragmatics by defining it as the study of specific problems (one might
call them analogous to the concept philosophemes 'pragmat(h)emes') related
to language, its users, context, and action can be found in over 2000 years
of 'pragmatic' research is conceded by the authors and therefore - also
because of maters of competence which seems to be a general problem of
the historiographer educated in a particular 20th-century discipline -
they restrict themselves to "the route leading to modern linguistic pragmatics
at the juncture of the 18th and 19th centuries" (p.8). On their way from
1700 up to the 1950s, the eve before the institutionalization of pragmatics
as a serious topic in linguistic research, the role of the language user
in speech contexts (the social dimension of language) is made the central
issue in tracing candidates for a place in the "history of pragmatic ideas":
The scope of this book is however not only limited as
to the periods and geographical spaces it covers, it is also restricted
to a more social view of pragmatics, leaving aside the area of 'formal
semantics' and 'formal pragmatics'. (p.8)
The more analytical and philosophical traditions the authors seem to maintain
are excluded in their book, although, for instance, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938)
and other phenomenologists like Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) are discussed.
And precisely these authors, according to Michael Dummett,6 should
be considered to be the founders of British analytical philosophy next
to thinkers like Gotlob Frege (1848-1925). And this road they did not want
to follow. I presume that the "history of pragmatic ideas" made the NC
that enthusiastic about what they found in for instance Husserl's or Meinong's
work that they did not want to leave it out of their "history of ideas"
- which immediately shows the danger of the history of ideas to end up
in an overwhelming number of author's, concepts, traditions, disciplines
etc. So if one takes the author's limitation to the less formal tradition
of pragmatic ideas this seems to be not quite correct.
In their search for sources of 19th and 20th-century pragmatic thoughts
NC take the following essentially pragmatic insights as their point of
departure:
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"the theory of moods [indicative, interrogative, and imperative] known
since Graeco-Roman days" (p.9); this already reveals an important aspect
of pragmatic thought: its fixation on sentences in which not primarily
the referential function of language is expressed but the communicative
function - the illocutionary force of language explicitly presupposes insights
in the structure of different sentence-types;7
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"the theory of deixis" (p.10); language is also anchored in reality. This
reality (cf. Karl Bühler's (1879-1963) 'I-here-now' as the origo
of deictic concepts) reveals the situation in which language is actually
used and which may serve as a commonplace in language use;
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"the field of rhetoric" (p.10); the persuasion of the other to believe
one's words was a technique practized since antiquity and part of the medieval
trivium which could be learned and used and therefore may be relevant
to pragmatics;
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"the awareness, [...], of a possible incongruence between linguistic forms
and their functions" (p.11); with the development of psychological research
in the 19th and 20th centure and the empirical study of human linguistic
behaviour this shift from a more formal analysis of language into an empirical,
situationally influenced study of human action and language use was realized;
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"language is based on convention and therefore abitrary" (p.12); with this
opinion, to be found among others in the work of De Saussure, the linguistic
sign received its meaning by its use in certain (linguistic and social)
contexts;
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"a last source of inspiration, especially for speech act theorists, [...is]
the philosophy of law or legal actions" (p.12); in social interaction following
rules (a central topic in later Witgenstein's 'philosophical investigations')
is be presupposed. Without social conventions, codified in claims and obligations,
a human society seems impossible. And, of course, language and the consequences
of the use of language are important in the codification of claims and
obligations.
Next to these positive 'influences' on the development of pragmatic thought
which can be abstractly reduced to the concepts 'contextualism' and 'functionalism'
(cf. p.376) three developments have negatively influenced a more functional
study of language:
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"the rejection of a reductionist notion of the sentence";
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"the notion of language as an organism";
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"the notion that language represents thought" (p.11).
These developments have excluded the role of the interlocutors in human
linguistic use. The act of speaking was inferior to the purely grammatical,
the biological or purely logical analysis of linguistic structures. In
fact, Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) was one of the first scientists
in Germany who stressed the function of the "act of speaking" (p.11) as
the true essence of language without, however, losing sight of the spiritual
character which underlies the possibility of speaking.
Now, if one looks closely at the structure of NC's book they do not
systematically develop the different theoremes which underlie their search
for pragmatists in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries. They rather chronologically
list the main representatives of what they call 'protopragmatics in Europe'
(1785-1835) - implicitly criticizing the opinion that the main ideas of
pragmatics were in fact an American invention -, 'pragmatism (1860-1930
in the United States', and 'pragmatism avant la lettre (1880-1935)
in Europe'. By the end of the book, in part 11.5,8
NC say something about the recent development of pragmatics in its institutionalized
form, in the form Austin and Searle handed it over to the linguistic audience,
i.e. without their forerunners. They have forgotten 'to hand over' their
own struggle with the tradition of pragmatic ideas which actually did exist
as NC show (cf. p.373).9
And therefore a reconstruction of the theoretical 'roots' of this
institutionalized' pragmatics as a part of the linguistic curriculum seems
to be justified by the lack of interest in historiographical maters shown
by "the 'father' of pragmatics": Austin, and his followers (p.373).
One can criticize the way NC 'do' pragmatic historiography by choosing
certain concepts, certain geographical regions, and certain 'overall' labels
to cover the history of pragmatics but the way they develop pragmatic thought
in different European and American regions chronologically deserves our
admiration. They have limited themselves to among others linguists, philosophers,
psychologists, sociologists who really had something to say on the functions
of language, on language use(rs) and the work is a Fundgrube for
those interested in the history and historiography of pragmatic research.
NC give a short biography of the main author's in their selection of pragmatic
thinkers, they list the important primary and secondary sources for each
person and link their main ideas to those of contemporary or earlier colleagues
working in the field. It is, for instance, interesting to know and to consider
a possible effect of the role of the Gesammelte Schriften of the
German legal author Adolf Reinach on Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) who owned
a copy which "survives, with annotations, in the Library of Linacre College
in Oxford" (p.214) or the fact that elements of pragmatic thought can as
well be found in what we nowadays would call the empirical as in the rational
traditions in philosophy, linguistics, etc. NC also give the original version
of the English, translated quotations at the end of the book; they also
add an extensive bibliography of primary and secondary literature and an
index of names with dates.
It would lead a reviewer of this book too much into details if s/he
would go into the careful and adequate observations made by NC. On the
other hand, it would have been easier for a reviewer, if the authors would
have made another choice, i.e. not to give this amount of information to
the reader but had described one or two of the aforementioned sources of
pragmatic research and had worked out the reception and analysis of these
pragmatic themes in the texts of a more or less 'coherent' group of pragmatic
thinkers - for instance around 1900 in Germany or France. Thus, NC have
shown that a lot of work is still to be done in the history and historiography
of pragmatics
Frank Vonk, Velp /Doetinchem
Footnotes
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H.O. Mounce (1997), The Two Pragmatisms. From Peirce
to Rorty (London, New York: Routledge), p.1 [Back to main
text]
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Cf. Klaus Oehler (1993), Charles Sanders Peirce. München:
Beck, p.35f. [Back to main text]
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Cf. Alec McHoul, "Kant’s pragmatics". Journal of Pragmatics
25 (1996), 587-592. This article is a reaction to Nerlich’s and Clarke’s
article "Language, action, and context: Linguistic pragmatics in Europe
and America"; in: The Journal of Pragmatics 22 (1994), 439-463. [Back
to main text]
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It has become clear by now that NC have restricted themselves
to the Western world. [Back to main text]
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The authors refer to the article "Is there a history
of pragmatics" by Anat Bilatzki in the Journal of Pragmatics 25 (1996),
455-470 in which it is maintained that "pragmatics seems to have no institutionalized
history" (p.455). The reason for this, as a matter of course, is its recent
introduction into the linguistic curriculum - if one restricts oneself
to this domain - and its extra-linguistic ramification in several other
disciplines. I think that it is not far beyond the historical reality to
make the statement that pragmatics is not a linguistic (sub-)discipline
at all but that the status of language in pragmatic research has been overvalued.
In fact, pragmatics is a higher level science than linguistics (cf. the
place of social psychology in Ferdinand de Saussure’s (1857-1913) Cours
in relation to his semiology). This thesis, by the way, is not meant
to be provocative but to represent the number of non-professional linguists
or ‘non-linguists’ in Nerlich’s and Clarke’s book. [Back
to main text]
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Michael Dummett (1988), Ursprünge der analytischen
Philosophie. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. Dummett criticizes the general opinion
that analytical philosophy has its origin in America and Great Britain.
This, he states, gives an inadequate, even wrong picture of the historical
context of analytical philosophy. Many British and American students completed
their study in Europe (Germany, the Habsburg empire including cultural
centres like Prague and Vienna) during the 19th and 20th century. The result
of the emigration of many scientist to America during World War II is another
chapter in the history of the transmission of philosophical, psychological,
and linguistic ideas. [Back to main text]
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The sentence "it is raining" for instance can be analyzed
in several ways and has been analyzed by several authors NC mention. It
can be found in the work of Anton Marty (1847-1914), Karl Bühler,
and Alan Henderson Gardiner (1879-1963). This sentence can be interpreted
as representing a particular state of affairs - with the initial problem
of reference, i.e. that there is no subject in this sentence, which may
cause problems of interpretation; cf. Karl Schuhmann (1990), "Contents
of Consciousness and States of Affairs: Daubert and Marty"; in: Kevin Mulligan
(ed.), Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics. The Philosophy and Theory of Language
of Anton Marty. Dordrecht etc.: Kluwer, 197-214. But it can also be interpreted
as an intention of a speaker to inform someone else what is going on outside
or it can be a request to close the window, to hand over an umbrella, etc.
This kind of analysis can be found in pragmatic texts of almost all other
protopragmatists in NC’s book. [Back to main text]
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Something must have gone wrong with the numbering of
the last sections of the book. After 11.2.5 on "Firth: the spectrum of
meaning" there is a section 11.5. on "Austin: problems with statements".
Obviously, sections 11.3 and 11.4 do not exist. In the table of contents,
however, the section on Austin does have the number 11.3. In the text (p.13)
it says: "We shall deal with this period [between 1940 and 1970] only briefly
in section 11.4." This is a nice way of ‘doing things with numbers’. [Back
to main text]
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Austin’s way to "the promise of pragmatism" was developed
in the 1940s and 1950s in relation to classical and modern analytical philosophical
work. In his studies of statements he drew the conclusion that they "can
in fact be nonsensical" (p.370) and not always give an adequate description
of reality: language has other ‘performative’ functions, such as promises
or orders which do not represent reality but the communicative function
of language. By the way, The Promise of Pragmatism is the title of a book
by John Patrick Diggins (1994; published by The University of Chicago Press)
in which he undertakes an analysis of "limitations of pragmatism from a
historical perspective and dares to ask whether America’s one original
contribution to the world of philosophy has actually fulfilled its promise".
This project is from NC’s point of view not an uninteresting one. [Back
to main text]